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Viewpoint Neutral Zoning of Adult
Entertainment Businesses
by SHIMA BARADARAN-ROBISON"
Zoning of strip clubs, adult video stores, and other adult enter-
tainment businesses is a frequent source of controversy and litigation in
many American cities. Community members often oppose strip clubs
moving into their city and many cities try to keep these businesses as far
from public life as possible. The Supreme Court's First Amendment
law has not helped this struggle. In fact, the current "secondary effects"
test used by the Supreme Court has actually made it more difficult for
cities to zone adult businesses. Although a few commentators have ex-
pressed their disapproval of the secondary effects test, they have all
complained that the test allows cities too much power or erodes consti-
tutional freedoms. Surprisingly, no commentator has ever argued that
the test actually does not defer enough to cities. This Article argues that
the secondary effects test weakens the state zoning power and imposes
an impossible task on cities in forcing them to ensure the economic
success of adult businesses. After exploring the main flaws of the sec-
ondary effects test as demonstrated by lower court decisions following
the Supreme Court's latest zoning decision in Alameda Books, this Ar-
ticle demonstrates how the Court can adopt a new "viewpoint neutral"
approach that allows cities to protect adult entertainment expression
while maintaining broad discretion under their zoning power.
Who wants to live next door to a strip club? Apparently, not
many of us. Americans seem to love racy television and movies, but
when it comes to adult entertainment businesses' ("sexually oriented
" Law Clerk to the Honorable Jay S. Bybee, United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, 2004-05. B.S., J.D. Brigham Young University. I would like to thank John
Fee for his helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. Adult entertainment businesses include "peep shows, adult video stores, porno-
graphic bookstores, special cabarets, rap parlors, liquor lounges, internet web sites, x-rated
pay-per-view channels, massage parlors, and 1-900 sex phone lines." Dana M. Tucker,
Comment, Preventing the Secondary Effects of Adult Entertainment Establishments: Is
Zoning the Solution?, 12 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 383, 392-93 (1997).
[4471
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
businesses" or "SOBs") moving to our communities, we put our foot
down.2 This is an ongoing controversy in American cities, and a fre-
quent source of litigation, especially with the growth in popularity of
adult businesses. Many residents oppose adult businesses because
they violate the "moral standards" of their community.4 Others be-
lieve that these businesses are degrading to women and undermine
healthy relationships
Since so many Americans oppose adult businesses moving in,
why do they flourish? Simply put, because of the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution. While cities have the power to create
zoning plans for the community, this zoning power is tempered by the
First Amendment.7 The First Amendment provides adult businesses a
2. Tucker, supra note 1, at 408 (noting that "[p]ublic hearings have overflowed
with... concerns about traffic, property devaluation, prostitution and other crimes" asso-
ciated with adult entertainment businesses).
3. JULES B. GERARD, LOCAL REGULATION OF ADULT BUSINESSES § 1.02 (2004)(noting that "[a] July 1991 request to the Nexis Information Service for current articles
about adult entertainment in major newspapers and magazines generated a list of 961 sto-
ries"). See, e.g., Bill Pike, Strip-club Controls May Be Added to Louisville Zoning Codes,
THE COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, KY), April 3, 2003, at 5B; Lisa Heyamoto, Kenmore
Extends Moratorium on Adult-Entertainment Shops, THE SEATTLE TIMES, September 24,2003, at B2 (noting the strong opposition to new strip clubs by community residents). See
also JULIAN CONTRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USEPLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION § 10.17 (2003) (noting New York City's
"massive and successful effort to rid the Times Square area of adult businesses is but
one... of the many municipal purges" of adult businesses in recent years) (citing Buzzetti
v. City of New York, 140 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 1998)).
The issue of adult entertainment has been a source of controversy for many years.
FREDRIC A. STROM, ZONING CONTROL OF SEX BUSINESSES: THE ZONING APPROACH
TO CONTROLLING ADULT ENTERTAINMENT (1977) (noting that since the 1970s "local
government authorities and the general public have been concerned about the prolifera-
tion and higher visibility across the country" of adult businesses).
4. Mary Brooks, Chuluota: Keep Out Adult Clubs: Seminole Commissioner Maloy to
Speak on Controversy Tonight, THE ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 23, 1997, at D1 (describing
an adult business zoning controversy where residents refuse to have adult businesses lo-
cate anywhere in their county and worry about the "health and safety" of their rural com-
munity).
5. See, e.g., Ira E. Stoll, Simi Residents Protest Adult Business Plan Demonstration:
Hundreds Rally at Site of What Would be the City's First such Establishment: They Vow toTake Pictures of Customers, THE L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1995, at B5, available at 1995 WL
2070942 (describing a mother who claimed that, "Pornography doesn't just degrade
women, it degrades and addicts men.").
6. The U.S. CONST. amend. I states: "Congress shall make no law.., abridging thefreedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the government for a redress of grievances."
7. States reserve the right to zone within their police power rights to regulate on be-half of the "health, safety, morals and general welfare" of the community. Scottsdale v.
Sup. Ct., 439 P.2d 290 (1968).
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constitutionally protected right to expression.8 In order to mediate the
rights of cities and adult businesses, the Court established the "secon-
dary effects" test. Under the secondary effects test, cities are able to
zone adult businesses in order to deal with the effects of these busi-
nesses rather than to regulate the content of the speech expressed by
the businesses. So, cities can zone adult businesses because, for ex-
ample, they cause a decline in the quality of urban neighborhoods and
increase prostitution, but not because a city disapproves of nude
dancing as entertainment.
Although the secondary effects test seems to create a reasonable
constitutional compromise in the zoning of adult businesses, 9 this Ar-
ticle explores several underlying weaknesses in the test. Many of
these weaknesses have surfaced in lower court decisions since the lat-
est Supreme Court adult business zoning decision, City of Los Ange-
les v. Alameda Books, Inc. ° These weaknesses include that the secon-
dary effects test 1) undermines the state zoning power by inflicting
greater evidentiary burdens on cities, thereby precluding cities from
experimenting with different zoning solutions, 2) limits cities' ability
to rely only on "quantifiable" secondary effects, rather than the broad
range of quantifiable and "intangible" secondary effects relied on in
the past, and 3) imposes a burden on cities to ensure economic viabil-
ity of adult businesses, rather than recognizing that zoning invariably
has negative economic effects. These weaknesses do not allow courts
to defer to the state zoning power while protecting adult speech.
While commentators have expressed approval
1 and disapproval 12
8. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972) (recognizing that some adult enter-
tainment should receive First Amendment "freedom of expression").
9. Dana M. Tucker, Preventing the Secondary Effects of Adult Entertainment Estab-
lishments: Is Zoning the Solution? 1998 ZONING AND PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK §
16.05[3] (Christine Carpenter ed., 1998) (asserting that zoning under the secondary effects
test along with criminal prostitution statutes and modification of the definition of obscen-
ity are necessary to combat the secondary effects of adult businesses).
10. 536 U.S. 921 (2002).
11. Mini M. Jelsema, Note, Zoning Adult Businesses after Los Angeles v. Alameda
Books, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1117 (2003) (expressing approval for Justice Kennedy's fur-
ther explication of the secondary effects test in Alameda).
12. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-19 at 952 (2d
ed. 1988) (noting that the secondary effects test violates First Amendment freedoms);
Stephanie Laskerbroad, Sex and the City: Zoning "Pornography Peddlers and Live Nude
Shows", 49 UCLA L. REV. 1139, 1144 (2002) (noting that cities have broad freedom to
"create restrictive zoning schemes to combat questionable secondary effects"); David L.
Hudson, Jr., The Secondary Effects Doctrine "The Evisceration of First Amendment Free-
doms," 37 WASHBURN L.J. 55, 55 (1997) (disapproving of the secondary effects tests and
arguing that its pervasive use "could well lead to an 'evisceration of First Amendment
freedoms."').
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for the secondary effects test, most criticize the secondary effects test
for deferring too much to citiest3 or eroding constitutional freedoms.
This Article argues that the Supreme Court should reject the secon-
dary effects test, not because it gives too much deference to cities, but
because it does not give enough. It asserts that the Court should ex-
amine zoning of adult businesses as a content based, time, place, and
manner speech regulation. This would avoid relying on the false
premise that the regulations are "content neutral" because they target
the effects of adult businesses rather than the speech itself. Although
normally, content based speech regulation requires an ordinance to
undergo strict scrutiny, the Court has made some exceptions to this
rule with low-value speech, like defamatory and commercial speech.
This Article proposes that the Court similarly analyze zoning of adult
businesses in a subcategory of content based regulation. The Court
should recognize adult business zoning as content based, but view-
point neutral, time, place, and manner speech regulation. This "view-
point neutral" approach avoids the false premise underlying the
Court's adult business zoning cases and allows the Court to properly
defer to states in zoning while meeting the constitutional demand to
protect freedom of speech. 4
Part I of this Article describes the broad nature of the state zon-
ing power and the First Amendment limitations on this power. Part II
13. See Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Stripping Away First Amendment Rights:
The Legislative Assault on Sexually Oriented Businesses, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y
287, 293-94 (2003) (concluding "that the deferential approach that most courts take with
regard to legislative judgments about the regulation of sexually oriented businesses unduly
restricts adult entertainment and the First Amendment"); Christopher Thomas Leahy,
Comment, The First Amendment Gone Awry: City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., Ailing Analytical
Structures, and the Suppression of Protected Expression, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1026(2002) (arguing that the secondary effects doctrine must be "both restrained and reevalu-
ated" before cities "exert increasing power to further suppress controversial expression");
Christopher L. Andrew, Note, The Secondary Effects Doctrine: The Historical Develop-
ment, Current Application, and Potential Mischaracterization of an Elusive Judicial Prece-
dent, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 1175 (2002) (noting that the Court should "take certain reme-dial measures [like scrutinizing legislative intent and "placing a stringent evidentiaryburden"] to ensure that the secondary effects doctrine does not provide a means for gov-
ernmental authorities to target and suppress unfavorable expression under the guise of
alleviating deleterious secondary effects in other contexts").
14. Although no commentator has before advocated the "viewpoint neutral" ap-proach asserted in this Article, one commentator has generally questioned the need for
content neutral time, place, and manner regulations. See GERARD, supra note 3, §2.03[1][c] (noting that the Court "has yet to articulate a principled way of distinguishing
between those situations in which viewpoint neutrality will be enough and those in which
content neutrality is enough" and that "[t]he Court has yet to offer an intelligible set of
reasons why time, place, and manner regulations should have to be content, as well as
viewpoint neutral").
rv,-,l q1"4
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explores the development of the secondary effects test in Supreme
Court jurisprudence, including the changes brought by the recent
Alameda decision.15 It recognizes that the Court did not want adult
business zoning regulations to undergo strict scrutiny, even though
they were content based. Thus, the Court formulated the "secondary
effects test" because it recognized that zoning was an important part
of a state's police power and that adult business expression was of
low-value under the First Amendment. Part III analyzes lower court
decisions applying the secondary effects test and demonstrates how
the test imposes an extensive evidentiary burden on cities even
though it is intended to broadly defer to cities in experimenting with
solutions to local zoning problems. It also demonstrates how the sec-
ondary effects test limits the types of secondary effects a city can con-
sider and creates a burden on cities to ensure the economic viability
of adult businesses in order to enact zoning ordinances. Part IV pro-
vides a new "viewpoint neutral" approach for analyzing adult busi-
ness zoning cases. Part V further clarifies this approach and explains
how it should be applied by courts. This new approach resolves the
evidentiary burdens of the secondary effects test that erode the state
zoning power, while conforming to early Supreme Court precedent
and protecting freedom of expression. Part VI provides a brief con-
clusion.
I. The Zoning Power and the First Amendment
The state police power reserves to states the right to regulate for
the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of its citizens.
6 As
early as 1926, the Supreme Court recognized zoning as a proper use
of the state police power.17 The Supreme Court in Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co. recognized the power of local governments to enact zoning
ordinances to preserve the quality of life of its citizens. 8 In general,
15. The Alameda decision has been very influential. See, e.g., World Wide Video of
Wash., Inc. v. City of Spokane, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1149 n.3 (E.D. Wash. 2002) affd, 368
F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that Alameda changed the legal landscape of the First
Amendment).
16. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 443 (1827) (first noting that an aspect of criminal
law is reserved to the states as part of their "police" power).
17. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (recognizing that the state po-
lice power extends to zoning).
18. Id. at 386-87 (noting that with increasing density of population, problems require
regulations regarding "the use and occupation of private lands in urban communities). In
addition, the Court held that a zoning regulation was proper under the police power as
long as it was not "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." Id. at 395.
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the Court has interpreted the state zoning power broadly."9 States are
permitted to zone for aesthetic reasons." to improve urban life,21 to
reduce noise and traffic,22 to reduce crime,23 and to increase the qual-
ity of neighborhoods.24 In addition, cities are permitted to zone in or-
der to protect public morals as defined by the community.25
19. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954) established this principle very
broadly:
Miserable and disreputable housing conditions may do more than spread disease
and crime and immorality. They may also suffocate the spirit by reducing thepeople who live there to the status of cattle. They may indeed make living an al-
most insufferable burden. They may also be an ugly sore, a blight on the commu-
nity which robs it of charm, which makes it a place from which men turn. The
misery of housing may despoil a community as an open sewer may ruin a river.We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not desir-
able. The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive .... The values it
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is
within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should bebeautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as
carefully patrolled.
The Supreme Court in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas allowed a zoning ordi-
nance that restricted land use in Belle Terre village to single-family homes and defined
"family" to only include people related by blood. 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974). The Court upheld
this ordinance as a legitimate use of the police power in addressing "family needs." Id. Jus-
tice Marshall further stated that zoning is "the most essential function performed by local
government... [as a means to protect] quality of life." Id. at 13 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(also pointing out that "the police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and un-healthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings
of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.").
20. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 3, §§ 12.2, 10.16 (stating that
"regulation of signs for reasons of... aesthetics has a long history" in the United States);
ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS, §§ 16.03-05 (Rohan & Kelly eds., 1998). See also
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 506 (1981) (agreeing that aesthetics is
a "substantial" government interest for cities to regulate commercial billboards).
21. Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976) ("[T]he city's interest in
attempting to preserve the quality of urban life is one that must be accorded high re-
spect."); see also JOHN J. DELANEY, ET AL., 1 LAND USE PRAC. & FORMS § 13:2 (2003)(noting that "[c]ourts have upheld zoning regulations of adult uses that are tied to public
welfare goals, such as... the protection of the quality of city neighborhoods") (citing
Northend Cinema, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 585 P.2d 1153, 1159 (Wash. 1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 946 (1979)).
22. Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729, 738 (11th Cir. 1983) (recognizing that
cities zone to reduce traffic, noise, and litter), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 827 (1984).
23. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 434 (2002)(noting that cities have the power to regulate in order to control crime rates).
24. Id.
25. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 575 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)("Our society prohibits, and all human societies have prohibited, certain activities not be-
cause they harm others but because they are ... immoral."). In America, examples include
"prohibitions ... [of] sadomasochism, cockfighting, bestiality, suicide, drug use, prostitu-
tion, and sodomy." Id. at 575. Justice Souter, in a Barnes concurrence, noted that it is ap-
I Vo 11 *AI
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However, the federal Constitution places limits on the state po-
lice power. For instance, when zoning threatens freedom of speech
and expression, the First Amendment is invoked and states do not re-
ceive the same deference. The First Amendment protects a wide vari-
ety of "expressive conduct," including adult entertainment.
2 6
Under certain conditions, states may regulate protected speech
or expression. One of the few permissible categories of proper state
regulation of speech is a time, place, and manner regulation.
27 Zoning
regulations constitute time, place, and manner regulations. Therefore,
cities are permitted to regulate adult entertainment "expression" un-
der this rationale.2
The amount of deference provided to states when regulating
speech or expression depends on whether a state regulation is content
based or content neutral under the First Amendment. Content based
zoning ordinances "limit communication because of the message con-
veyed., 29 In contrast, "[c]ontent-neutral restrictions limit communica-
tion without regard to the message conveyed."'  Content based
speech regulations must generally undergo strict scrutiny, unless it has
been recognized as an exception. 1
propriate to rely on the justification of "protecting societal order and morality" in passing
indecency ordinances but also secondary effects like increases in prostitution and sexual
assault should also be considered. Id. at 582 (Souter, J., concurring). See also Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (relying on a community standard to determine whether
pornography was obscene).
26. For example, the Court considers nude dancing by a stripper "expression" under
the First Amendment. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975) (protecting danc-
ing as expression under the First Amendment). See also Tucker, supra note 1, at 390-91
(explaining that "[tihe Supreme Court extended the First Amendment's protection of free
speech to cover many types of expressive conduct that are not technically speech.") (citing
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943) and Spence v. Washington,
418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)); Lisa Malmer, Comment, Nude Dancing and the First
Amendment, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1275, 1276 (1991). Compare Dallis v. Stanglin, 490 U.S.
19, 28 (1989) (holding that adult entertainment patrons watching strippers is not protected
expression under the First Amendment).
27. See, e.g., Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977).
28. While the time, place, and manner test specifically requires regulations to be
"content neutral," the Supreme Court has implicitly recognized some content based regu-
lations as permissible. See Part IV.A.
29. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 189, 190 (1983) (discussing the evolution of and the "merits and limitations
of the content-based/content-neutral distinction").
30. Id. at 189.
31. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 800 (1996)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Exceptions to this rule include de-
famatory speech and commercial advertising. See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427
U.S. 50, 66-69 (1976).
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Viewpoint based regulations limit communication because of the
viewpoint or idea expressed on a particular topic. Viewpoint based
regulation of speech is never allowed because it is at the heart of First
Amendment speech protection." Adult business zoning cases have
traditionally relied on the content-based/content-neutral distinction.
Some cases have mentioned the importance of viewpoint neutral
regulations; however, none have explicitly relied on this distinction in
zoning SOBs.33
H. The Evolution of the Secondary Effects Test
The seminal Supreme Court case dealing with zoning of adult
businesses is Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc. 34 In Young, a
plurality upheld Detroit's zoning ordinance that prohibited adult
businesses from operating within 1,000 feet of other such businesses,
or within 500 feet of a residential area.35 The Court plurality, led by
Justice Stevens, held that a city "may control the location" of adult
theaters as well as "other commercial establishments. ' 36
The Stevens plurality recognized this zoning ordinance as a time,
place, and manner regulation. 7 However, Justice Stevens also recog-
nized that the ordinance was content based because it was targeted
only at adult businesses, not all businesses. To fall under the time,
place, and manner test, an ordinance usually has to be content neu-
32. Stone, supra note 29, at 197. A viewpoint-based regulation is invalid because "theFirst Amendment forbids the government from regulating speech in ways that favor some
viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others." Members of the City Council of the City of
L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 803 (1984). See also Regan v. Time, Inc., 468
U.S. 641, 648-649 (1984).
33. See, e.g., Encore Videos, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 330 F.3d 288, 292 (5th Cir.2003) (noting that the "'principle inquiry in determining content neutrality, in speech
cases ... is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of dis-
agreement with the message it conveys"') (emphasis added) (quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530
U.S. 703, 719 (2000)) (internal citations omitted).
34. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
35. The types of businesses included under this ordinance included adult theaters,
"adult book stores, cabarets, bars, taxi dance halls, and hotels." Id. at 50. Two adult thea-
ters challenged the zoning ordinance as violating the First Amendment. Id. at 58. The
adult theaters also alleged that the ordinances violated the Due Process Clause and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
36. Id. at 62 (Justice Stevens said that cities may control the location "either by con-fining them to certain specified commercial zones or by requiring that they be dispersed
throughout the city.").
37. Young, 427 U.S. at 63 n.18.
[Vnl g1"4
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tral. However, the Court plurality pointed out that in some instances
content based regulations of speech are permitted.3" A few examples
include profanity, confidential government information, defamation,
and commercial speech.39 The Court explained that zoning of adult
businesses also falls in this category because these regulations are un-
affected by the message or viewpoint4° expressed in the film.4' There-
fore, the Court recognized that zoning, along with commercial speech
and profanity, may constitute a permissible exception within content
based speech regulation."
38. Id. at 65-66 (The Court also held that the fact that the ordinance treated adult
theaters differently than other theaters did not "offend the First Amendment.").
39. Id. at 66-68 (noting that these are examples where "difference[s] in content re-
quire a different governmental response"); id. at 66 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942)) (profanity like "a statute punishing the use of "damned Fas-
cist(s)"); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (commercial speech regu-
lation allowing a transit system to accept some advertisements and reject others); Near v.
Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (important government information like
the "sailing dates of [war] transports or the number and location of troops"); N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (defamation where courts rely on the content of an
article being about a public official in order to require a higher standard of proof);. The
Court also pointed out that obscenity cases also allow content based regulation. Young,
427 U.S. at 69-70 (pointing out that Ginsberg v. New York allows prohibiting distribution
of obscene materials to minors and unconsenting adults even though the regulation is
based on "an appraisal of the content of the material").
40. Further, the Court plurality explained that the key to government regulation is that the
government cannot discriminate based on whether it agrees with the viewpoint expressed. Young,
427 U.S. at 67. The Court elaborated that the use of "streets and parks for the free expression of
views on national affairs may not be conditioned upon a sovereign's agreement with what a
speaker may intend to say." Id. at 63. Further, the Court noted that speech cannot be restricted
because "it invites dispute, creates dissatisfaction with conditions the way they are, or even stirs
people to anger." Id. at 63--64.
The Court plurality recognized that the ordinance was viewpoint neutral, but instead
said that it was content neutral. It explained that the state's "agreement or disagreement with the
content of what a speaker has to say may not affect the regulation of the time, place, or manner of
presenting the speech." Id. at 64 (emphasis added). To further evidence that the Court was refer-
ring to "viewpoint" neutral rather than "content" neutral government regulation, the Court also
pointed out that "[t]he essence of that rule is the need for absolute neutrality by the government;
its regulation of the communication may not be affected by sympathy or hostility for the point of
view being expressed by the communicator." Young, 427 U.S. at 67 (emphasis added).
Although the Court plurality phrased this limitation in terms of "content," the
right language to describe this concept is "viewpoint" neutral since the Court referred to
agreement with the message of the speaker rather than the ability of the speaker to address
that particular topic. In addition, the plurality recognized that like with commercial
speech, zoning of adult businesses was content based-but fell into an exception. There-
fore, a city could regulate it without invoking strict scrutiny.
41. Id. at 70 (noting that the "regulation of the places where sexually explicit films
may be exhibited is unaffected by whatever social, political, or philosophical message a
film may be intended to communicate") (emphasis added).
42. Id.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
After deciding that this ordinance was a content based regulation
(though recognizing implicitly, that it was also viewpoint neutral) the
Court examined whether the city's interest justified the regulations.43
The Court deferred to the city council determination based on only a
few expert opinions that this ordinance would "preserve the quality of
urban life.""
Justice Powell who provided the fifth vote with his concurrence,
agreed with Justice Stevens that the Detroit ordinances did not vio-
late the First Amendment. 45  However, he did not defend the ordi-
nance because it was viewpoint neutral or justify it based on the
broad zoning power allowed to local governments. Instead, he
claimed that the ordinance was not content based because it allowed
the "city to treat certain movie theaters differently" because they
have "different effects upon their surroundings.4 6 Justice Powell first
articulated the secondary effects test. The secondary effects test was
based on the premise that zoning ordinances can avoid being consid-
ered "content based" because their purpose is to limit negative sec-
ondary effects of adult businesses, rather than to suppress speech.
Under the traditional definition of content based zoning, adult busi-
ness zoning ordinances would have been considered content based
because they limit communication based on the message conveyed. In
other words, a city would zone all adult businesses in its boundaries
and not supermarkets because of the message conveyed by adult
businesses. Rather than recognize that the ordinance was content
based and claim that it should be classified as an exception (that does
not have to undergo strict scrutiny), like commercial speech, Powell
relied on the secondary effects test.47
43. Id. at 71.
44. Id. The plurality, interpreting the zoning power broadly, recognized that preserva-
tion of "quality of life" was a substantial enough government interest to justify the regula-
tion.
45. Young, 427 U.S. at 73 (Powell, J., concurring) (He analyzed the case as an "inno-
vative land-use regulation" which implicated the First Amendment "only incidentally and
to a limited extent."). Powell disagreed with the dissent that this zoning ordinance was an
impermissible content based time, place, and manner restriction. Id. at 82 n.6 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
46. Id. at 82 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
47. Part of the problem was that the former option was not well-articulated by the Young
Court. The Court presented the option of regulating adult business zoning as an exception along
with commercial speech and defamation; however it did not articulate a principled reason why it
should fall into this category. This may have been why this rationale did not win a majority over
the secondary effects rationale. As this Article points out in Part IV, the principled distinction the
Court should have articulated is that the content-based exceptions discussed all regulate low-
value speech.
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In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., the Court obtained a
majority to uphold a Renton city zoning ordinance prohibiting "adult
motion picture theaters from locating within 1,000 feet of any residen-
tial zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or
school. ' 4" The Court held that the ordinance was content neutral and
explicitly adopted the secondary effects test.4 '9 However, the Court
noted that the fundamental principle was that the government should
not suppress "less favored or... controversial" regulations and favor
acceptable views. 0 Again, the Court seemed to emphasize that the
key to a valid ordinance is viewpoint neutrality, not content neutral-
ity.
The Renton Court then set out a two factor inquiry to determine
whether an ordinance is valid. The Court considered 1) whether the
ordinance is "designed to serve a substantial governmental interest"
and 2) whether it "allows for reasonable alternative avenues of com-
munication."51 In examining the government interest, the Court found
In determining the effect of the ordinance, Justice Powell determined that the or-
dinance would have a minimal effect on limiting the production, regulating the content of,
or limiting viewer's access to the adult films. Id. at 77. In this analysis, he mentioned that
although some viewers would be "inconvenienced by this dispersal," some "may find it
more convenient" and the "number of adult movie theaters in Detroit will remain ap-
proximately the same." Young, 427 U.S. at 79. Justice Powell analyzed the permissibility of
the ordinance under the test of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). Young,
427 U.S. at 79. The four factors considered were: 1) whether the regulation was "within
the constitutional power of the Government"; 2) "if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest"; 3) "if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression"; and 4) "if the incidental restriction on ... First Amendment freedoms is
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Id. at 79-80 (quoting
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
48. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 43 (1986).
49. Id. at 47 (noting that the ordinance was "completely consistent with our definition of
content-neutral speech regulations as those that 'are justified without reference to the content of
the regulated speech' since the ordinance was justified by reference to the secondary effects)
(internal quotations omitted).
The Court noted that it is irrelevant that "a motivating factor" of the city in passing an
ordinance was to restrict free exercise rights. Id. at 47. Only the "'predominant' intent" of
the city in passing an ordinance is relevant. Id. at 48. To determine predominant intent,
the Court examined the terms of the ordinance and recognized that the city did not try to
"close" or restrict the number of adult businesses but limited "their choice as to location."
Id. Therefore, despite the fact that the findings demonstrate that many of the "stated rea-
sons for the ordinance were no more than expressions of dislike for the subject matter"
sold by the adult business, the ordinance was valid under the First Amendment. Id. at 59
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted). The dissent required more evidence
that the city's findings related to secondary effects and that the ordinance was not enacted
based on improper motivations. Id. at 59-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
50. Renton, 475 U.S. at 48-49.
51. Renton, 475 U.S. at 50.
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that the ordinances were passed after a "long period of study and dis-
cussion of the problems of adult movie theaters" and that there was
testimony at trial on this topic. 2 Then, in determining whether rea-
sonable alternative avenues existed, the Court determined that even
though "practically none" of the land zoned for adult businesses was
"for sale or lease" there still existed reasonable alternative avenues
for speech 3
The Renton Court adopted the secondary effects test and the
faulty premise that zoning regulations are content neutral. However,
it maintained that courts must defer to local governments in zoning.
In addition, the Court majority deferred to the city's broad zoning
power in examining its government interest and the existence of al-
ternative avenues for speech.
In City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., two adult estab-
lishments challenged a city ordinance that prohibited more than one
adult business from occupying the same building. 4 In analyzing the
ordinance, Justice O'Connor, joined by three justices, again relied on
Renton in determining that the ordinance was "content neutral" be-
cause it was aimed at the secondary effects of the adult businesses
rather than at the expression.5 Justice Scalia joined the Court's judg-
ment but concurred noting that the "secondary effects" test is unnec-
essary and that the "Constitution does not prevent those communities
that wish to do so from regulating, or indeed entirely suppressing, the
business of pandering sex."56
Justice Kennedy concurred, creating a majority and the law in
this case. 7 Justice Kennedy also relied on the secondary effects ra-
tionale, but pointed out that this ordinance was content based, not
content neutral.58 However, he still applied intermediate scrutiny un-
der Renton (not strict scrutiny) even though the ordinance was con-
52. Id. at 51 (quoting Northend Cinema, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 585 P.2d 1153, 1155
(Wash. 1978)).
53. The Court was not concerned that the land was not commercially or economically
viable. It only required that the land was theoretically open to adult businesses in the zon-
ing scheme.
54. 535 U.S. 425,429 (2002).
55. Id. at 440-41.
56. Id. at 443-44 (Scalia, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 444 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193
(1977) (In a plurality opinion, the opinion of the Justice who supplies the fifth vote and
concurs on grounds narrower than those put forth by the plurality is controlling).
58. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 444 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that, like
billboards that "obstruct a view," speech may cause secondary effects).
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tent based." Kennedy added an additional requirement to the test:
"the quantity and accessibility of the speech [must be left] substan-
tially intact."0
In applying the secondary effects test, Justice Kennedy recog-
nized an important point that has never been recognized by a major-
ity of the Court: adult business zoning ordinances are content based,
not content neutral regulations. However, Justice Kennedy did not
recognize that adult business zoning can be an exception to content
based regulations by making a parallel to commercial speech or
defamation (as Justice Stevens did in Young), but instead claimed
that it was an exception because the ordinances targeted secondary
effects.
The secondary effects test evolved because the Court recognized
that zoning ordinances targeted solely at adult businesses (rather than
all businesses) were content based regulations. Under the First
Amendment, unless they fall in an exception (like defamation or
commercial speech), these regulations must undergo strict scrutiny.
59. Id. at 447, 448 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy claimed that these
regulations did not deserve strict scrutiny because they have a "legitimate purpose: to limit
the negative externalities of land use." Id. at 449 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Ken-
nedy also emphasized that cities must provide "very little evidence," id. at 451 (Kennedy,
J., concurring), but must demonstrate that their ordinance has the purpose and effect not
to reduce speech, id. at 445 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
In deciding whether the city satisfied the evidentiary burden, Justice Kennedy
claimed there were two important questions. Id. at 449 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting
that cities could provide evidence from other jurisdictions rather than studying the secon-
dary effects itself). First, "what proposition does a city need to advance in order to sustain
a secondary effect ordinance? Second, how much evidence is required to support the
proposition?" Id. In response to the first question, Justice Kennedy required that the ordi-
nance has the "purpose and effect of suppressing [the] secondary effects" of speech." Id. at
445-46. Further, Kennedy noted that if the two results of a city ordinance are that a busi-
ness has to "move elsewhere or close," the "city's premise" cannot be the latter." Id. at
450-51. The city's proposition, then, must be that the two businesses must "split rather
than one to close," so "that the quantity of speech will be substantially undiminished." Id.
at 451. In describing the second proposition, Kennedy answered that "very little evidence"
is required at the outset and in general "courts should not be in the business of second-
guessing fact-bound empirical assessments of city planners." Id. at 451.
60. Id. at 445, 449 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that "[t]he purpose and effect of
a zoning ordinance must be to reduce secondary effects and not to reduce speech" and fur-
ther explaining that a "trivial decrease in the quantity of speech" is allowed if the ordi-
nance "cause[s] a significant decrease in secondary effects" and again "[t]he challenge is to
protect the activity inside [adult establishments] while controlling the side effects outside
[like an ordinance restricting slaughterhouses to a "remote part of town"]). Justice Ken-
nedy also clarified later that a "zoning law need not be blind to the secondary effects of
adult speech, so long as the purpose of the law is not to suppress it." Id. at 447. He also
criticized the O'Connor plurality for failing to "address how speech will fare under the
city's ordinance." Id. at 450.
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However, the Court did not want to force these regulations to un-
dergo strict scrutiny for two reasons. First, because zoning is an im-
portant part of a state's police power.6 Second, because the Court
recognized early on that adult business speech was of low-value under
the First Amendment. While the Supreme Court developed the sec-
ondary effects test partly to allow local governments room to develop
zoning plans, lower courts often fail to accord proper deference to cit-
ies under the secondary effects test.
III. Weaknesses of the Secondary Effects Test
Several problems with the secondary effects test have come to
light since Alameda. Lower courts seem to struggle most with the
level of evidence to require of cities under the Renton test. Alameda
requires that cities ensure that the "quantity" and "accessibility" of
adult speech remain "substantially intact" after an ordinance. It also
requires that cities do not enact zoning ordinances with the "purpose"
of suppressing speech. However, this new standard leaves many un-
answered questions. For example, what does it mean for an ordinance
to leave the quantity of adult speech substantially intact? If most of
the adult businesses are not commercially viable because of market
conditions in the areas they are zoned to, does that make an ordi-
nance invalid? Does this overrule Renton, which specifically holds
that cities are not required to consider the commercial viability of
adult establishments as a result of an ordinance? While Justice Ken-
nedy in Alameda still emphasizes that the Renton standard requires a
low level of evidence from cities, it has been used by many lower
courts to impose great evidentiary burdens on local governments.
The weaknesses of the secondary effects test explored in this sec-
tion relate to the increased evidentiary burden imposed on cities in
lower court cases. First, the secondary effects test undermines the
state zoning power by creating greater evidentiary burdens on cities,
precluding cities from experimenting with different solutions. Second,
it often limits cities to be able to rely only on "quantifiable" secon-
61. The Court recognized that broad deference is due to states in zoning for the pro-
tection of the quality of life. Like in Young, the Renton Court majority allowed broad def-
erence to the local government in justifying its city ordinance. However, the dissent dis-
agreed with the majority's deferential attitude toward the city council in enacting the
Renton zoning ordinance. The dissent pointed out that the intent of the ordinance to
"promote... protecting.., the quality of [Renton's] neighborhoods, commercial districts,
and the quality of urban life" was amended "after the lawsuit commenced." Renton, 475
U.S. at 58 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In addition, the dissent points out that there were "no
indications" in the legislative history that the city council was concerned about remedying
secondary effects. Id. at 59.
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dary effects rather than the broad range of quantifiable and intangible
secondary effects relied on in earlier cases. Third, it creates a burden
on cities to ensure economic viability of adult businesses rather than
recognizing that zoning inevitably has negative economic effects.
A. Greater Evidentiary Burdens on Local Governments
1. Evidentiary burdens imposed by the Supreme Court
The controlling Supreme Court cases all emphasize that local
governments bear a low evidentiary burden in proving an important
government interest. Under the secondary effects test, a city's impor-
tant government interest must be to mitigate negative secondary ef-
fects, rather than to suppress speech. In examining a city's important
government interest, the Court has deferred greatly to cities and has
recognized the broad zoning power of cities to protect the quality of
62local communities.
In Young, the Court plurality deferred to the city's interest in
protecting the quality of urban life based only on a few expert opin-
ions.63 The Young dissent did not dispute the adequacy of this evi-
dence. Similarly, in Renton, the Court upheld the city's justification
for a zoning ordinance even though the preamble justifying the ordi-
nance based on secondary effects was amended after the ordinance
was challenged. The Court found that the evidence of a "long period
of study" of this issue and evidence presented at trial on the secon-
dary effects of adult theaters was adequate.6' The Court majority did
not require any specific preenactment evidence of secondary effects. 65
In Alameda, the Court majority agreed that the preamble, stating that
the purpose of the ordinance was to remedy secondary effects, was
adequate to demonstrate the city's important interest.' The Alameda
62. See Part I, supra notes 16-21.
63. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50,64 (1976).
64. Renton, 475 U.S. at 51. Id. at 59 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Northend Cin-
ema, 585 P.2d at 1154-55).
65. Id. at 59 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Renton dissent criticized this holding and
insisted that although there was evidence that the city council studied this issue, there was
no preenactment evidence that the city council relied on secondary effects.
66. In Alameda, Justice O'Connor rejected the Court of Appeals' requirement that
the "city provide evidence that not only supports the claim that its ordinance serves an
important government interest," but that its interpretation of the evidence produces the
same results as the court's. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 438. Justice O'Connor fur-
ther recognized that a "city may rely on any ... reasonably... relevant" evidence, id. at
438 (quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52) (not "shoddy data or reasoning" to demonstrate a
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Court also agreed that the city did not have to rely on empirical evi-
dence that their ordinance remedies secondary effects but that they
could rely on "common sense."67 Throughout Supreme Court prece-
dent, the Court has emphasized that cities bear a low evidentiary bur-
den in demonstrating an important government interest, despite the
secondary effects test.
2. Evidentiary burdens imposed by lower courts
Although Supreme Court precedent allows broad deference to
cities in adult business zoning, lower courts often require a much
higher evidentiary standard to demonstrate an important government
interest in remedying secondary effects.
A few circuit courts of appeals insist that a city prove the exis-
tence of secondary effects before it can demonstrate an important
governmental interest.68 In addition, the Fifth Circuit required a city
to prove the effectiveness of a zoning ordinance in combating secon-
dary effects in order for it to pass constitutional muster. In applying
connection between speech and an important government interest).
67. Justice O'Connor explained in Alameda that the city's "evidence must fairly sup-
port ... [its] rationale for its ordinance." 535 U.S. at 438. And if the plaintiffs do not dem-
onstrate that the city's "evidence does not support its rationale or [cast doubt on this ra-
tionale] by furnishing evidence that disputes the municipality's factual findings," the city
meets the standard. Id. at 438-39. However, if plaintiffs cast "doubt" on the city's ration-
ale, "the burden shifts back to the... [city] to supplement the record with evidence renew-
ing support for a theory that justifies its ordinance." Id. at 439. This burden-shifting stan-
dard seems to require the city to bear a higher evidentiary burden than did Young or
Renton, depending on how it is interpreted. The O'Connor plurality did point out though,
that the evidence required by the city does not have to consist of empirical data and can be
"an appeal to common sense" unless plaintiffs provide "actual and convincing evidence...
to the contrary." Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 438. Justice O'Connor points out that
Justice Souter would require that the city "verify[] that the ordinance actually reduces the
secondary effects asserted [to] ... ensure that [the ordinance is not] merely [a] content-
based regulation[] in disguise." Id. at 441 (emphasis added). However, according to Jus-
tice O'Connor, that "proposal [is] unwise and is not what Renton requires." Id. at 441.
See also PATRICIA E. SALKIN, 2 N.Y. ZONING LAW & PRAC. § 18:07.1 (4th ed. 2003)
(noting that the practical implication of Alameda is that "local governments may continue
to use secondary effects studies to demonstrate the negative impacts on communities that
face a concentration of adult business/entertainment uses").
68. Encore Videos Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 330 F.3d 288 (5th Cir. 2003); Flani-
gan's Enter., Inc. v. Fulton County, 242 F.3d 976, 985 (11th Cir. 2001) (requiring evidence
that adult businesses result in "undesirable community conditions," (quoting Grand Fa-
loon Tavern, Inc. v. Wicker, 670 F.2d 943 (11th Cir. 1982))); Phillips v. Borough of Key-
port, 107 F.3d 164, 173 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that cities must present "evidence of inciden-
tal adverse social effects" to prove an important government interest (quoting Mitchell v.
Comm'n on Adult Entm't Establishments, 10 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 1993))). But see Erie Blvd.
Triangle Corp. v. City of Schenectady, 250 F. Supp. 2d 22, 30-31 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (only
requiring that the city's preamble demonstrate a goal to eliminate secondary effects).
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the "important government interest" standard, the court did not only
require the government to demonstrate an "important" 
interest. 69
The court also required that "the challenged statute ... is effective in
serving that interest."70  Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in R.V.S.,
L.L.C. v. City of Rockford7' struck down a zoning ordinance because
the city did not provide evidence that it "significantly reduce[d] nega-
tive secondary effects."'  Requiring that a statute is effective in miti-
gating secondary effects specifically contradicts what the Court re-
quired in Alameda.73 Requiring proof of existence of secondary
effects and effectiveness of an ordinance in combating secondary ef-
fects dramatically increases the evidentiary burden on a city in enact-
ing zoning ordinances.
Some courts have required separate secondary effects evidence
for two adult business ordinances passed at the same time and even
for separate parts of one ordinance.74 Other courts have also rejected
zoning ordinances modeled after ordinances that have "survived judi-
cial review," even though this is an important means for many under-
69. Encore Videos Inc., 330 F.3d at 293. But see N.W. Enters. Inc. v. City of Houston,
352 F.3d 162, 175 n.5, 180 (5th Cir. 2003) (explaining that the Supreme Court does not re-
quire "proof of efficacy of an ordinance" in addressing secondary effects and pointing out
that "municipalities [are not] required to prove, not merely by common sense, but empiri-
cally, that SOB ordinances will successfully reduce crime, as this would undermine Ren-
ton's allowance of local experimentation in responding to secondary effects").
70. Encore Videos Inc., 330 F.3d at 293. The court explained that "[o]ff-site busi-
nesses differ from on-site ones, because it is only reasonable to assume that the former are
less likely to create harmful secondary effects." Id. at 295 (emphasis added) (explaining
that "[i]f consumers of pornography cannot view the materials at the sexually oriented es-
tablishment, they are less likely to linger in the area and engage in public alcohol con-
sumption and other undesirable activities") (citing World Wide Video Inc. v. City of Tuk-
wila, 117 Wash. 2d 382, 816 (1991)). The Encore court, without any evidence, substituted
its own judgment for that of the local government. See also J&B Entm't Inc. v. City of
Jackson, 152 F.3d 362, 371 (5th Cir. 1998) (requiring evidence that the ordinance zoning
on-site and off-site viewing of adult video establishments eliminates some secondary ef-
fects).
71. 361 F.3d 402 (7th Cir. 2004).
72. Id. at 411.
73. Justice O'Connor specifically points out that Justice Souter would require that the
city "verify ... that the ordinance actually reduces the secondary effects asserted [to] ...
ensure that [the ordinance is not] merely [a] content-based regulation . . . in disguise."
Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 441 (emphasis added). However, according to the
O'Connor plurality, that proposal is unwise and is not what Renton requires. See id. at
441-42.
74. Peek-A-Boo Lounge of Bradenton, Inc. v. Manatee County, 337 F.3d 1251, 1267
(11th Cir. 2003) (criticizing the district court for analyzing the two ordinances (zoning and
public indecency) "and their accompanying evidence into a single analysis").
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resourced cities to enact proper zoning ordinances. 7 Neither of these
requirements were instituted by the Supreme Court but added by
lower courts.
The Eleventh Circuit in Peek-A-Boo recently required the city to
supplement secondary effects evidence because it relied on older
studies from other cities when the SOBs provided local, empirical
evidence contradicting the city's evidence.76 Although the court
claimed that this was not "a battle of competing experts," it would bedifficult for the city to justify its interest without providing local em-pirical evidence refuting the SOB's.' This contradicts Supreme Courtprecedent which maintains that cities do not need to provide local
evidence of secondary effects.78
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently required
that secondary effects studies document negative effects of the same
type of SOB considered in the city passing an ordinance, even though
75. SDJ, Inc. v. Houston, 837 F.3d 1268, 1274 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting that it is "notenough" to "tailor one ordinance to another that has survived judicial review"); see alsoPeek-A-Boo, 337 F.3d at 1267 n.15 (rejecting evidence in the record that the County cited
a similar ordinance passed in Florida that upheld on appeal as "insufficient to satisfy theCounty's evidentiary burden under Renton."); cf BAS Enterprize, Inc. v. City of Maumee,282 F. Supp. 2d 673, 682 n.9 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (rejecting the argument that a small city
cannot rely on evidence from a larger sized city). This requirement contradicts the logic ofthe Court in Renton, which allowed cities to rely on the studies of other cities in enacting
zoning ordinances. If a city can rely on another city's evidence of secondary effects, why
not be able to rely on other city's ordinance as a model? If the issue were that cities arediverse and different secondary effects are at issue in different cities, then the court would
not allow cities to rely on other city's studies about secondary effects.
However, some cities have relied on model ordinances that have been successfullydefended in court. See Anthony Millican, Topless Bar Ruling Vote Delayed; St. CloudResidents Planning Board Say City's Present Requirements Discourage Adult Entertain-
ment, OSCEOLA SENTINEL, April 30, 1994, at 1.
76. Peek-A-Boo, 337 F.3d at 1272 (casting doubt, under the Alameda standard, on thecity's "outdated, foreign studies" after adult businesses presented local empirical studies
"suggesting that plaintiffs businesses, which have operated continuously in ManateeCounty for over fifteen years, do not cause secondary effects") (relying on Flanigan's En-ter., Inc. v. Fulton County, 242 F.3d 976, 986-87 (11th Cir. 2001)). However, in Flanigan,the court found adult businesses' "outdated" "foreign studies" unconvincing when faced
with "the county's own current, empirical data [which] conclusively demonstrated that
such studies were not relevant to local conditions." Id. at 986.
77. Peek-A-Boo, 337 F.3d at 1272.
78. Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52 (1986) (noting that "the First Amendment does not re-quire a city, before enacting such an ordinance, to conduct new studies or produce evi-dence independent of that already generated by other cities, so long as whatever evidencethe city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city ad-dresses"). Although Alameda does not require empirical evidence by cities, JusticeO'Connor's plurality opinion infers that the evidence required by cities is greater if the
adult businesses have produced contrary evidence. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 439.
Summer 2004] VIEWPOINT NEUTRAL ZONING OF ADULT BUSINESSES 465
Supreme Court precedent has always assumed that similar secondary
effects accompanied all SOBs. 79 In Encore Videos Inc., the city of San
Antonio sought to zone adult entertainment establishments which al-
lowed viewing of sexually explicit materials on-site and off-site."
° The
city relied on studies conducted by other cities demonstrating the sec-
ondary effects of adult businesses, which the Supreme Court permit-
ted in Renton.8' However, the court held that these studies were not
adequate to support the zoning regulations because they did not dis-
tinguish between the secondary effects of on-site adult entertainment
and off-site entertainment.' The Fifth Circuit held that since the stud-
ies did not examine the same type of adult entertainment that San
Antonio was regulating, adequate evidence did not exist to create an
important government interest." The Ninth Circuit in World Wide
Video of Washington, Inc. v. City of Spokane also assumed, without
deciding, that there is a constitutional difference between different
types of SOBs. 84
Several courts have also required preenactment evidence and
legislative history to demonstrate the city's interest, rather than just
evidence produced at trial, like Renton required.85 The Eleventh Cir-
79. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 584 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring)
(noting that the same secondary effects that may result from adult films may also result
from nude dancing).
80. Encore Videos Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 330 F.3d 288, 294 (5th Cir. 2003).
81. Id. at 294; see also Renton, 475 U.S. at 51.
82. Encore Videos Inc., 330 F.3d at 295 (The court concluded that "some substantial
evidence of the secondary effects of establishments that sell adult products for off-site
consumption" was necessary to support this ordinance.).
83. Id. (The court also specifically mentioned that this ordinance was especially ex-
pansive because it could potentially reach "ordinary bookstores and video stores with
adult sections" like Barnes and Noble.).
Other courts have not required specific evidence of secondary effects for different types
of adult businesses and have specifically rejected the relevance of the on-site/off-site dis-
tinction. See Z.J. Gifts D-2, L.L.C. v. City of Aurora, 136 F.3d 683, 687 (10th Cir. 1998)
(holding that on-site/off-site viewing of sexually explicit materials is not relevant in deter-
mining whether secondary effects exist); ILQ Inv., Inc. v. City of Rochester, 25 F.3d 1413,
1418 (8th Cir. 1994) (same).
84. 368 F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004) (assuming without deciding "that the distinction
between retail-only stores and stores with preview booths is constitutionally relevant" but
upholding the ordinance involved because the city heard specific testimony about the sec-
ondary effects of retail-only stores).
85. SOB, Inc. v. County of Benton, 317 F.3d 856, 862 (8th Cir. 2003) (examining
whether a city considered preenactment secondary effects evidence in determining whether
the Renton standard was satisfied); D.H.L. Assocs., Inc. v. O'Gorman, 199 F.3d 50, 57 (1st
Cir. 1999) (same); Z.J. Gifts D-2, L.L.C., 136 F.3d at 690 (same); Hickeson v. City of New
York, 146 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1998) (requiring some secondary effects evidence in the
legislative record); but see N.W. Enters. Inc. v. City of Houston, 352 F.3d 162 (5th Cir.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
cuit recently invalidated a zoning ordinance because it was not sup-
ported with studies demonstrating secondary effects of SOBs at the
time of enactment. 6 The court was not satisfied with the "volumes of"
secondary effects evidence produced on behalf of a public indecency
ordinance passed only four months later.' This requirement imposes a
greater burden than Renton, which upheld a zoning ordinance with-
out any preenactment evidence, where secondary effects evidence
was presented later at trial.Y This is also a higher standard than Ala-
meda where the Court was satisfied by reading the language of the
preamble which explained that the ordinance targeted secondary ef-
fects.
3. Increased evidentiary burden reduces deference to local governments
The high evidentiary burden required by many lower courts
demonstrates the difficulty of applying the secondary effects test
while deferring to local governments.' For a city to demonstrate that
2003).
86. Peek-A-Boo Lounge of Brandenton, Inc. v. Manatee County, 337 F.3d 1251,
1268-69 (11th Cir. 2003).
87. Id. at 1253, 1266, 1267 (noting that the zoning ordinance "failed to rely on any
evidence whatsoever that might support the conclusion that the ordinance was narrowly
tailored to serve the County's interest in combating secondary effects ... at the time of
enactment") (citing also Ranch House v. Amerson, 238 F.3d 1273, 1283 (11th Cir. 2001)(requiring "some" preenactment evidence under Renton)). The Eleventh Circuit was con-
cerned that the evidence of secondary effects was specific to the public nudity ordinance,
not the zoning ordinance. Id. at 1267.
88. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51 (1986); Barnes v. GlenTheatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 582 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring). Other courts have adopted
Renton's logic. See N.W. Enters. Inc. v. City of Houston, 352 F.3d 162,175 (5th Cir. 2003)(explaining that a local government "need not demonstrate that the City Council actually
relied upon evidence of negative secondary effects when it enacted" a statute and can rely
on evidence "developed prior to the ordinance's enactment and that adduced at trial" be-
cause the "appropriate focus is not an empirical inquiry into the actual intent of the enact-ing legislature, but rather the existence or not of a current governmental interest" which
the ordinance supports) (citing J&B Entm't, Inc. v. City of Jackson, 152 F.3d 362, 371-72(5th Cir. 1998)); DiMa Corp. v. Town of Hallie, 185 F.3d 823, 829-30 (7th Cir. 1999)(agreeing with the district court "that a municipality may make a record for summaryjudgment or at trial with evidence that it may not have had when it enacted its ordi-
nance"); Phillips v. Borough of Keyport, 107 F.3d 164 (3d Cir. 1997) (explaining that localgovernments do not need to rely on preenactment evidence of secondary effects). See alsoBGHA, LLC v. City of Universal City, 340 F.3d 295, 299, 300 (5th Cir. 2003) (allowing evi-dence that the city's interest in enacting a zoning ordinance was to eliminate secondary
effects, even though supporting affidavits were drafted postenactment and "minutes do
not specifically discuss the secondary effects of SOBs").
89. For instance, in R. V.S., L. L. C. v. City of Rockford, 361 F.3d 402, 411 (7th Cir.2004), the court determined that "evidence of a higher than average incidence of prostitu-
tion in the [area where SOBs were located], testimony from two local officials that police
action had not been effective to curb prostitution activity, and testimony from a city al-
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its interest is important, it may first have to demonstrate with evi-
dence (from the city itself or other similarly-sized cities) that secon-
dary effects exist as a result of existing SOBs and that the ordinance
will be effective in mitigating secondary effects.' This evidence may
have to be produced preenactment and for this ordinance alone, based
on evidence of the same type of SOB regulated in a city, and the study
may also have to be up-to-date.
For many cities to meet all of these heightened requirements,
they will have to conduct new local studies demonstrating secondary
effects. This evidentiary burden is much more than what Renton and
Alameda require.91 For instance, a city faces difficulty acting preventa-
tively to avoid possible problems when it must first demonstrate that
secondary effects exist because of SOBs. If a city without any existing
SOBs wants to experiment by dispersing future SOBs throughout
residential areas, it may first have to demonstrate with evidence from
other cities or experts that negative secondary effects result from
SOBs. However, since no SOBs exist in the city and since this zoning
scheme has probably not been tried by any city before, the city would
not have local evidence to prove existence of secondary effects.' A
similar evidentiary burden results from forcing cities to justify regula-
tions with up-to-date studies, studies based on the same type of SOB,
derman that "strip clubs have negative secondary effects on adjoining residential proper-
ties" was not enough to meet the "minimal" evidentiary burden of Alameda.
90. In New York, for example, "courts have not yet recognized that municipalities
can rely solely on studies from other municipalities." SALKIN, supra note 67, § 18:08 (citing
Stringfellow's of New York, Ltd. v. City of New York, 91 N.Y.2d 382, 400 (1998)) (relying
on the fact that New York City had conducted its own study and had not relied solely on
others) and Town of Huntington v. Pierce Arrow Realty Corp., 627 N.Y.S.2d 787, 788
(App. Div. 1995) (noting that the "[town did not produce proof, by testimony or affidavit,
as to whether, prior to its enactment of the ordinance in question, it had conducted any
studies, or had even reviewed comparable studies, concerning the deleterious effect upon
the quality of life in its business community caused by the presence of adult-use establish-
ments")). However, New York federal courts have upheld ordinances without a local
study. Id. (citing Tri-State Video Corp. v. Town of Stephentown, 1998 WL 72331
(N.D.N.Y. 1998)). Since both are applying federal constitutional law, however, the re-
quirements under Renton and Alameda should be the same.
91. See supra note 76 and note 89. In addition these cases establish the importance of
allowing cities to experiment with zoning solutions. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 52 (cities must
be given a "reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions").
92. The Supreme Court has emphasized that it does not require local governments to
provide empirical studies when it requires the city to allow SOBs to exist in a community
where they did not exist before. See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S.
425, 440 (2002) ("A municipality considering an innovative solution may not have data
that could demonstrate the efficacy of its proposal because the solution would, by defini-
tion, not have been implemented previously"-as was the case with Los Angeles' munici-
pal ordinance in Alameda.).
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and the other heightened evidentiary requirements imposed by lower
courts.93 Lower courts impose these heightened requirements despiteSupreme Court precedent that emphasizes that local governments are
better suited to make zoning decisions than the judiciary.9,
In contrast, ordinary zoning regulations only require cities to ra-tionally believe that the regulation will improve the quality of com-
munity life.95 The city can consider the opinions of local and state ex-perts and interested members of the community96 and then decide
what is best for the city. 7 The city does not have to demonstrate that aproblem already exists or rely on the experiences of other cities. Aslong as the city does not demonstrate an improper motive, the zoning
regulation is valid. The city is permitted to respond preventatively as
well as in reaction to land use issues that face the city. In addition, cit-ies may respond to perceived problems with solutions that may never
have been tried before.
If secondary effects evidence was not required for a city to prove
an important government interest, local governments would have
more room to experiment with solutions to land use problems. Rather
93. SALKIN, supra note 67, § 18:08 (recognizing that "[t]he requirement for a secon-dary effects study can be difficult for small suburban municipalities or in municipalities
with no existing adult uses").
94. Justice O'Connor in Alameda recognized the importance of deference to localgovernments because, for example she noted that "the Los Angeles City Council is in abetter position than the Judiciary to gather and evaluate data on local problems." Ala-
meda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 440, 442 (also pointing out that "[m]unicipalities will, in gen-
eral, have greater experience with and understanding of the secondary effects that follow
certain protected speech than will the courts" and that intermediate (not strict) scrutiny is
applied) (internal citations omitted).
95. N.W. Enters. Inc. v. City of Houston, 352 F.3d 162, 180 (5th Cir. 2003) (explainingthat general zoning decisions are "upheld on a rational basis standard" and in SOB zoning
cases the legislature must only provide evidence "reasonably believed to be relevant to the
secondary effects in question") (internal citations omitted).
96. But see N. W. Enters. Inc., where the court considered the opposition of the publicrelevant in evaluating the government's concern about secondary effects. 352 F.3d at 181
n.15 (pointing out that the public through various community and civic associations from
"the wealthiest to the poorer neighborhoods" expressed concern about the secondary ef-fects of SOBs and concern over the effect of SOBs on "efforts to renovate rundown or
disadvantaged neighborhoods").
97. In Center For Fair Public Policy v. Maricopa County, 336 F.3d 1153, 1168 (9th Cir.2003), for example, the court determined that it was appropriate that the Arizona legisla-ture relied on evidence "reasonably believed to be relevant" which included "public hear-ings at which lawmakers heard citizen testimony concerning the late night operation of
sexually-oriented businesses[.]" See also SALKIN, supra note 67, § 18:08 (In New York, for
example, cities can consider "community opposition ... to bolster [a] study and show theconnection between the statistical evidence and negative effects" along with "testimony of
real estate experts, planners and police personnel") (citing Stringfellow's of New York,
Ltd. v. City of New York, 91 N.Y.2d 382, 400 (1998)).
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than allowing a city's government interest to be based on a rational
goal to improve the city, local governments must prove that their so-
lution will be effective in solving the problems. Requiring proof of ef-
fectiveness limits cities in experimenting with solutions. Proving that
problems exist already, as discussed above, also limits cities in acting
preventatively to solve foreseeable problems. It forces cities to design
a plan that will be "effective" in order to even attempt to solve the
problem. This contradicts what the framers of the Constitution and
the Supreme Court have established as the role of cities and states.98
The framers and Court require that cities have room to experiment
with different solutions to local problems. Certainly, some cities
would implement unsuccessful zoning schemes. But cities would re-
tain the right to experiment and develop better schemes as a result.99
This would allow courts to provide broad deference to local govern-
ments as dictated by the Supreme Court."
B. "Quantifiable" and "Intangible" Secondary Effects
The second weakness of the secondary effects test is that it only
allows cities to consider "quantifiable" secondary effects rather than
the broad range of quantifiable and intangible secondary effects re-
lied on in earlier cases.
The Supreme Court has articulated two types of negative secon-
dary effects. Some "secondary effects" are intangible and unquantifi-
able. These include deterioration of urban life and city neighbor-
hoods,' decrease in quality and character of community life,"° and
98. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919-20 (1997) (noting that the "Framers re-
jected the concept of a central government that would act upon and through the States,
and instead designed a system in which the state and federal governments would exercise
concurrent authority over the people-who were, in Hamilton's words, 'the only proper
objects of government."') (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 109 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). See also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 148, 161-66
(1997); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 169-70 (J. Mayer ed.,
1966).
99. The Young, Renton, and Alameda Courts emphasized the importance of cities be-
ing allowed to "experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems." Alameda
Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 439; City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 52
(1986) (Cities must be given a "reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions[.]");
Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976).
100. A city would still have to meet First Amendment scrutiny by demonstrating that
the purpose of the ordinance was not to suppress speech. But rather than examining the
city's interest by the negative secondary effects caused by adult businesses, the Court actu-
ally examines the city's purpose in enacting the ordinance to determine whether it has a
valid interest. Whereas, currently cities are required to rely on the effects of SOBs, as well
as the government's purpose in establishing an important government interest.
101. See, e.g., N.W. Enters. Inc. v. City of Houston, 352 F.3d 162, 180 (5th Cir. 2003)
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degradation of order and public morality. 3 Other secondary effects
are quantifiable. These include increases in crime (including "racket-
eering, arson, murder, narcotics, bookmaking, pornography, profit
skimming, and loan sharking"), 4 late night visitors,'°5 traffic, noise,
theft,' O prostitution,' °7 and sexual assault.'°8
1. Supreme Court considers both quantitative and intangible secondary
effects
The Supreme Court has considered both quantitative and intan-
gible secondary effects in establishing an important government in-
terest under the Renton test. In Young, the Court plurality deter-
mined that the city's interest in protecting the quality of urban life
was an important government interest.' ° Protection of the quality of
urban life is an intangible secondary effect. The Young Court did not
require any quantifiable secondary effects. In Renton,"' the city ar-
ticulated several intangible secondary effects including "degradation
of the community standard of morality," a "degrading effect upon the
relationship between spouses," and a "loss of sensitivity to... the
concept of non-aggressive, consensual sexual relations.'' The city
also articulated several quantifiable secondary effects, including in-
creases in crime, prostitution, rape, incest, and assaults in the area.
The Court majority made no distinction between the two types of
secondary effects. The Court only noted that the zoning ordinances
(noting "neighborhood blight" as a secondary effect).
102. SALKIN, supra note 67, § 18.08 (noting that cities zone because of the "deteriora-
tion of community character and quality of life").
103. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 582 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring)(noting that it is appropriate to rely on the justification of "protecting societal order and
morality" in passing indecency ordinances); see also id. at 575 (Scalia, J., concurring).
104. Tucker, supra note 1, at 408.
105. SALKIN, supra note 67, § 18:08 (noting that smaller cities may be especially inter-
ested in controlling the "influx of rowdy outsiders, late night traffic and noise").
106. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 430 (asserting "higher rates of prostitution, rob-
bery, assaults, and thefts in surrounding communities").
107. Tucker, supra note 1, at 408.
108. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 582; Tucker, supra note 1, at 408 (noting that "the spread ofHIV, increased prostitution, increased rape, and neighborhood deterioration are also ad-
verse secondary effects attributed to adult businesses").
109. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 56,64 (1976).
110. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51 (1986).
111. Id. at 59 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (The city also claimed a "loss of sensitivity
to the adverse effect of pornography on children, established family relations, respect for
marital relationship and for the sanctity of marriage relations of others" as intangible sec-
ondary effects.).
[Vnl l'&.
rVol 31:4
Summer 2004] VIEWPOINT NEUTRAL ZONING OF ADULT BUSINESSES 471
were passed after a "long period of study and discussion of the prob-
lems of adult movie theaters." ' While the Renton dissent distin-
guished quantifiable secondary effects from intangible secondary ef-
fects, the majority of the Court made no such distinction."' Possibly
because of the Renton dissent's rejection of intangible secondary ef-
fects in that case, in Alameda, the city did not rely on any intangible
secondary effects. The city only asserted an increase in crime rates
and a decrease in property values due to adult businesses." ' There-
fore, the Court did not consider the relevance of intangible as op-
posed to quantifiable secondary effects. However, Justice Kennedy
noted briefly that "high concentrations of adult businesses" nega-
tively affect "the integrity of... [a] neighborhood." '115 He also noted
that these effects cause "measurable" damage that is "all too real."'1 6
While the O'Connor plurality did not comment on a city's ability to
rely on intangible secondary effects, Justice Kennedy's mention of
secondary effects like "integrity of the neighborhood" seems to sup-
port the continued relevance of intangible effects."7
2. Lower courts tend to consider only quantitative secondary effects
Like Los Angeles, many other cities nationwide no longer rely
on intangible secondary effects to support zoning ordinances. This
trend is also evident in lower court cases analyzing the constitutional-
ity of SOB zoning ordinances. However, as demonstrated above, Su-
preme Court precedent does not dictate this result. The majority of
the Supreme Court has never indicated that cities may not rely on in-
tangible secondary effects as well as quantifiable secondary effects.
Many lower courts still consider quantifiable as well as intangible
secondary effects in evaluating a city ordinance. These courts con-
112. Id. at 51.
113. Id. at 60 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the city of Renton for relying on "in-
tangible findings").
114. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 430.
115. Id. at 444 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
116. Id. (Justice Kennedy also noted that "[t]he law does not require a city to ignore these
consequences if it uses its zoning power in a reasonable way to ameliorate them without sup-
pressing speech."). The city of Los Angeles did not focus on intangible secondary effects in its
brief to the Supreme Court, but did rely on Young and Renton for the importance of deference to
local governments. Petitioners' Brief at 16, Alameda Books, Inc. (No. 00-799), 2001 WL 535665,
at *16 (2002).
117. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 444 (also citing Young for the proposition that a
"city's interest in attempting to preserve the quality of urban life is one that must be ac-
corded high respect"); see also Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976)
(plurality opinion).
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sider increased crime rates as well as "neighborhood blight" and
"negative effects on family activities" important government inter-
ests. 11 However, some lower courts have only considered quantifiable
secondary effects like increased crime, prostitution, and decreased
property values." 9 Some courts only consider some secondary effects
"relevant" in determining a city's governmental interest.2 Although
most cities are equally concerned with intangible and quantitative
secondary effects, they often try to defend ordinances based on quan-
118. See SOB, Inc. v. County of Benton, 317 F.3d 856, 862 (8th Cir. 2003) (The Ordinance
states that its purpose is to "prohibit public indecency in order to deter criminal activity, to pro-
mote societal order and public health and to protect children," and considers intangible and tangi-
ble effects including "increase[s in] criminal activity, including prostitution, disorderly conduct
and sexual assault; expos[ure of] children to an unhealthy and nurtureless environment; fos-
ter[ing] social disorder by disrupting the orderly operation of public events and public accommo-
dations."); Jake's, Ltd., Inc. v. City of Coates, 284 F.3d 884, 888 (8th Cir. 2002) (stating that the
city ordinance's purpose was to "reduce criminal activity, prevent the deterioration of residential
neighborhoods, and eliminate the 'dehumanizing influence' that sexually oriented businesses may
have on churchgoers, park users, and daycare clients"); Z.J. Gifts D-2, L.L.C. v. City of Aurora,
136 F.3d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating that the city's purpose in enacting the zoning ordi-
nance was to "protect[ ][its] citizens from increased crime; preserve[ ] the quality of life, property
values, and character of neighborhoods and businesses; deter[ ] the spread of urban blight; and
protect[ ] against the spread of sexually transmitted diseases..."); Holmberg v. City of Ramsey,
12 F.3d 140, 143 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting secondary effects including "increased crime, dimin-
ished property values, and general neighborhood blight"); Cmty. Visual Communications, Inc. v.
City of San Antonio, 148 F. Supp. 2d 764, 777 n.6 (W.D. Tex. 2000) (describing a city ordinance
that targeted adverse impacts on property values as well as impacts on "family activities and chil-
dren"); World Wide Video of Wash., Inc. v. City of Spokane, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1151 (E.D.
Wash. 2002) affd, 368 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that the intent of the Ordinance was to
"control health, safety, and welfare issues, the decline in neighborhood conditions in and around
adult retail establishments, and to isolate dangerous an[d] unlawful conduct associated within
these facilities").
119. Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1186 (10th Cir. 2003) (noting that
the city council was concerned with "negative secondary effects such as "crime, prostitu-
tion, and lowered property values; venereal disease, prostitution, general poor sanitation,
criminality, and offenses against minors"); Encore Videos, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 330
F.3d 288, 291 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that "relevant" harmful secondary effects of adult
businesses include crime, reduction of economic activity, and lowered property values);
DiMa Corp. v. Town of Hallie, 185 F.3d 823, 829-30 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that "undesir-
able secondary effects could include the spread of crime and sexually transmitted diseases,
a decline in property value, or an increase in public sexual acts"); Lakeland Lounge of
Jackson, Inc. v. City of Jackson, 973 F.2d 1255, 1257 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that "bad"
secondary effects include "crime, deterioration of their retail trade, and a decrease in
property values"); DiMa Corp. v. High Forest Township, No. CIV.02-3800 (DWF/SRN),
2003 WL 21909571, at *3 (D. Minn. Aug. 7, 2003) (only considering the adverse secondary
effects that adult entertainment business had on crime rates and property values).
120. In Encore Videos, Inc., the court only recognized "[r]elevant harmful secondary
effects" like "crime, reduction of economic activity, and lowered property values" as justi-
fying a time, place, and manner zoning regulation. 330 F.3d at 291 (emphasis added) (cit-
ing Lakeland Lounge of Jackson, Inc., 973 F.2d at 1255, 1257).
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tifiable secondary effects.12' This causes two difficulties for cities.
First, it is much more difficult for a city to demonstrate intangible
secondary effects than quantifiable ones. For example, it would be
much harder for cities to provide evidence that future SOBs will de-
crease public morality or adversely affect family activities than to
prove that. they lead to an increase in crime rates. It would be even
more difficult for a city to prove the effectiveness of a zoning ordi-
nance in upholding public morality. This prevents cities from relying
solely on intangible interests (including quality of community life or
protection of public morality) which were considered important to
the Supreme Court in developing the secondary effects test.
122
Second, cities may even face difficulty relying on quantifiable
secondary effects evidence because much of this evidence has recently
been placed in doubt. In a recent article, Bryant Paul et al. demon-
strate that most of the secondary effects studies relied on by cities are
either methodologically flawed or, if scientifically sound, show no
evidence of secondary effects due to SOBs.123 Basically, this recent
study indicates that even with quantifiable secondary effects, it may
121. Beverly Hills, Cal., Ordinance 98-0-2302 (July 2, 1998) (noting that the purpose of
the ordinance "include[s] ... depreciation of property values, increased vacancy rates in
residential and commercial areas; increased criminal activity; increased litter, noise, and
vandalism; and interference with the enjoyment of residential property in the vicinity of
such businesses"); see also Essence, Inc. v. City of Federal Heights, 285 F.3d 1272, 1286
(10th Cir. 2002) (explaining that the City of Federal Heights' preamble noted that secon-
dary effects included "increased rates of certain crimes, the spread of sexually transmitted
diseases, and harmful effects on surrounding residences and businesses including de-
creased property values and parking and traffic problems").
While cities often only set forth quantifiable secondary effects to defend ordinances,
cities are often just as concerned with intangible secondary effects. See, e.g., Press Release,
Wise County Sheriffs Department, Sexually Oriented Business Applies for License in
Wise County (Jan. 10, 2001), available at http://www.sheriff.co.wise.tx.us/press/01-10-
01.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2005) (commenting that Sheriff Ryan vowed to fight against
adult businesses because "it detracts from our citizen's quality of life" and because most
citizens oppose these businesses), available at www.sheriff.co.wise.tx.us/press/01-10-01.htm
(last visited Feb. 26, 2005).
122. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976).
123. Bryant Paul, et al., Government Regulation of "Adult" Businesses Through Zon-
ing and Anti-Nudity Ordinances: Debunking the Legal Myth of Negative Secondary Effects,
6 COMM. L. & POL'Y 355-56 (2001). This article concludes that:
with few exceptions, that the scientific validity of the most frequently used stud-
ies is questionable and the methods are seriously and often fatally flawed. These
studies, relied on by communities throughout the country, do not adhere to pro-
fessional standards of scientific inquiry and nearly all fail to meet the basic as-
sumptions necessary to calculate an error rate. Those studies that are scientifi-
cally credible demonstrate either no negative secondary effect associated with
adult businesses or a reversal of the presumed negative effects.
Id. at 387.
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be impossible for cities to rely on many of the classic studies from
other cities.124 One lower court and at least one appellate court have
already cited to and relied on this study." Cities may be forced either
to fund improved, scientifically sound studies or conduct independ-
ent, local studies when passing zoning ordinances.
Under the current "secondary effects" test, lower courts some-
times limit relevant government interests to include only quantifiable
secondary effects. It is much more difficult for cities to prove intangi-
ble secondary effects and courts are less likely to consider these rele-
vant. In other instances of commercial zoning, cities can zone out
businesses because they are an eye sore or because a community does
not value that type of commercial business. However, this is often not
permitted with adult businesses, because cities cannot rely on intangi-
ble concerns like community values or aesthetics in zoning these
businesses. Cities have to demonstrate quantifiable secondary effects
caused by the businesses. With recent studies, quantifiable secondary
effects may be even harder to prove. In some cases, cities may be left
with no choice but to conduct independent, local studies in order to
pass a zoning ordinance. This creates a challenge for cities that often
lack the resources to fund the kinds of scientific studies that SOBs are
able to fund. Further, this erodes the police power by imposing a bur-
den on what is otherwise a right reserved to state and local govern-
ments. 
12 6
C. Ensuring Economic Viability
Another weakness of the secondary effects test is that it creates a
burden on cities to ensure economic viability of adult businesses
rather than recognizing that zoning often has negative economic ef-
fects.
1. Supreme Court does not require cities to ensure economic viability in
zoning
The Supreme Court has emphasized that cities do not have to
124. Id.
125. DiMa Corp. v. High Forest Township, No. CIV.02-3800 (DWF/SRN), 2003 WL
21909571, at *3 (D. Minn. Aug. 7, 2003) (relying partly on Bryant Paul study to deny city's
summary judgment motion); GM Enters., Inc. v. Town of St. Joseph, 2004 WL 1090884, at
*6, petition for cert. filed (U.S. May 10, 2004) (No. 03-1549) (pointing out that petitioners
provided a copy of the Paul study to the district court); Brief for Appellant at 17, GM En-
ters., Inc. v. Town of St. Joseph, 2003 WL 22734113 (7th Cir. 2003) (using Paul's study to
argue that the studies cited by the town could not "reasonably be relied on by any decision
maker").
126. See supra Part I.
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ensure that adult businesses remain economically viable after zoning
ordinances.127 In Young, Justice Powell noted that zoning often has
detrimental economic effects."2 In Renton, the Court majority pointed
out that cities should not be concerned with SOBs being able to "ob-
tain sites at bargain prices."'29 The Court also held that it was enough
that SOBs could theoretically relocate in the city where no "commer-
cially viable" locations existed.' However, in Alameda, Justice Ken-
nedy took Renton a step further. He explained that when zoning
SOBs, the "quantity and accessibility" of the speech must remain
"substantially undiminished.''.
Supreme Court precedent dictates that cities do not have to as-
sure the economic viability of SOBs, but cities must leave reasonable
alternative avenues for speech.'32 In Alameda, the Court has inter-
preted this to mean that zoning ordinances must leave the quantity of
speech intact.
2. Lower courts often require cities to ensure economic viability in zoning
Alameda does not overrule Young's and Rentons' holdings that
cities do not have to ensure that adult businesses remain economically
viable after a zoning ordinance. However it is unclear what it means
for cities to leave the "quantity" of SOBs intact. Also, how does a city
127. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986); Young, 427 U.S.
at 78 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that the "inquiry for First Amendment purpose is not
concerned with economic impact"). See also David Vincent, Inc. v. Broward County, 200
F.3d 1325, 1334 (11th Cir. 2000).
128. Justice Powell also focused more on the effect of the zoning ordinance than the
plurality. He distinguished between the permissible "economic loss" that may be caused
by zoning ordinances with the impermissible effect of suppression of production or restric-
tion of "access to adult movies." Young, 427 U.S. at 77-78 (Powell, J., concurring). He fur-
ther noted that the Court's concern was not "economic impact" but "the effect of this or-
dinance upon freedom of expression." Id. at 78 (Powell, J., concurring).
129. Renton, 475 U.S. at 53-54 (noting that the ordinance left "some 520 acres or more
than five percent of the entire land area of Renton, open to use as adult theater sites").
The Court rejected the argument of the Court of Appeals that "practically none of the un-
developed land" was "for sale or lease" and that there were no "commercially viable adult
theater sites.., left open by the ordinance. Id. at 53. The Court held that businesses must
"fend for themselves in the real estate market, on an equal footing with other prospective
purchasers and lessees." Id. at 54. Further, the Court emphasized that the First Amend-
ment does not "ensure that adult theaters" or other "speech-related businesses will be
able to obtain sites at bargain prices." Id. at 54 (citing Young, 427 U.S. at 78) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
130. Renton, 475 U.S. at 54.
131. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 425,445,449 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (In other
words, a city may "not regulate the secondary effects of speech by suppressing the speech
itself.").
132. Renton, 475 U.S. at 52.
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provide reasonable alternative avenues while allowing SOBs to "fend
for themselves" in the market? Lower courts struggle with these ques-tions . 3
While lower courts disagree on how to determine whether rea-
sonable alternative avenues exist, many have applied tests that seem
to require cities to ensure the economic viability of SOBs. Several
lower courts use a "supply and demand" approach to determine
whether alternative channels exist. Under this approach, the city must
guarantee a specific number of sites that the existing number of SOBs
can relocate to." One court required a minimum of at least twelve
sites, or 1% of the city acreage to be allocated to SOB sites.'35 While
for some courts, even one more possible site than the existing number
of SOBs is adequate. 36 Other courts, like Justice Kennedy infers is
133. Bigg Wolf Discount Video Movie Sales, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 256 F. Supp.
2d 385, 395 (D. Md. 2003). The court considered four factors in determining whether there
were reasonable alternative avenues of communication:
1) whether to consider the sites available to Bigg Wolf individually or to the
group of adult entertainment businesses affected by the ordinance as a whole, 2)
whether to consider the reasonableness of alternative avenues of communication
at the time the ordinance was passed, at the time suit was filed, at present, or at a
time looking forward and projecting the potential number of businesses that
might need to locate in the designated zones, 3) whether the site needs to be eco-
nomically feasible for an adult entertainment business or merely physically avail-
able, and 4) whether the sites need to be actually available for sale or rent or
merely potentially available.
Id. at 395. In Brandywine, Inc. v. City of Richmond, 359 F.3d 830, 836 (6th Cir. 2004), the
court determined that whether reasonable alternative avenues of communication exist is
determined by whether a zoning ordinance provides "no reasonable opportunity for adult
businesses to operate anywhere within the city."
134. See, e.g., Fly Fish, Inc. v. City of Cocoa Beach, 337 F.3d 1301, 1310 (11th Cir.
2003) (noting that the supply and demand test guarantees "that the number of sites avail-
able under a new zoning ordinance is not less than the existing sites" so that "the ordi-
nance does not suppress speech, but merely relocates it"); N.W. Enters. Inc. v. City of
Houston, 352 F.3d 162, 182-183 (5th Cir. 2003) (considering the number of possible SOB
sites remaining relevant and finding city estimates of the number of sites too conclusory
for summary judgment purposes); David Vincent, Inc. v. Broward County, 200 F.3d 1325,
1336 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting that the number of sites should be correlated to the number
of existing SOBs); Cam I, Inc. v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Gov't, 252 F. Supp. 2d
406, 413 (W.D. Ky. 2003). But see Bigg Wolf, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 398 (not requiring a "set
number or ratio of sites" to satisfy reasonable alternative avenues).
135. Dia v. City of Toledo, 937 F. Supp. 673, 678 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (explaining that
"courts have generally found the number [of SOB sites] to be inadequate if fewer than a
dozen sites, or under 1% of city acreage, is potentially available"). Tri-State Video Corp.
v. Town of Stephentown, 1998 WL 72331, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 1998) ("Because adult
entertainment businesses can operate in 67% of the total amount of commercial/industrial
land, with 17% currently vacant, the Court finds this to be a sufficient 'reasonable oppor-
tunity to open and operate."') (internal citation omitted).
136. Woodall v. City of El Paso, 49 F.3d 1120, 1127 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that one
more site than the existing number of adult businesses meets the Renton requirement for
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appropriate in Alameda, require the exact same number of available
sites before and after the ordinances. 13 7 Other courts have balanced
factors such as the 1) the "size of the [city] population," 2) the "geo-
graphical size" of the city, 3) the "number of acres available to adult
uses as a percentage of geographic size," 4) "the location of the sites
within the municipality," 5) "the number of adult entertainment es-
tablishments currently in existence," and 6) "the number of adult en-
tertainment establishments wishing to operate within the municipal-
ity. '"38 Still other courts have considered the "most meaningful
measure" to be the "relationship between the number of available
sites and the size of the population.' 3 9 These courts look for a specific
ratio of SOBs per number of people in the population.' For example,
"one site per 12,565 persons based on a population of 238,726" was
determined to be sufficient for a Florida city.' But, one SOB for
28,257 people has been determined to not be enough for a Michigan
city.
A city may also have to present evidence that potential SOB sites
alternative avenues of communication); Lakeland Lounge v. City of Jackson, 973 F.2d
1255, 1259, 1260 (5th Cir. 1992) (allowing eight to ten possible SOB locations when six
SOBs currently exist, but noting that Renton does not require a certain proportion or
number of available locations); see also Fly Fish Inc., 337 F.3d at 1311-12 (while not ex-
plicitly adopting a bright line rule "that a zoning ordinance that does not provide sufficient
sites for the relocation of all existing adult entertainment establishments is unconstitu-
tional," invalidating an ordinance because it "provided only three sites for four lawfully
[and long time] existing adult entertainment establishments").
137. See, e.g., Buzzetti v. City of New York, 140 F.3d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 1998) (failing to
uphold an ordinance unless it allows all "existing adult establishments to continue to oper-
ate" somewhere in the city); North Ave. Novelties, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 88 F.3d 441,
445 (7th Cir. 1996) (requiring that no individual tried to open an SOB and was precluded
by a city zoning ordinance); Topanga Press, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 989 F.2d 1524,
1532 (9th Cir. 1993) (precluding a city ordinance from allowing less SOBs to exist in a city
than the number of SOBs existing when the zoning ordinance was enacted).
138. Boss Capital, Inc. v. City of Casselberry, 187 F.3d 1251, 1254 (11th Cir. 1999). See
also Young v. City of Simi Valley, 216 F.3d 807, 822 (9th Cir. 2000).
139. Executive Arts Studio, Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids, 227 F. Supp. 2d 731, 754
(W.D. Mich. 2002) (citing BBI Enter., Inc. v. City of Chicago, 874 F. Supp. 890, 896 (N.D.
I11. 1995) ("stating that the relationship between the number of sites available in a city for
adult uses and the size of the city's population is more relevant in determining supply and
demand")).
140. Executive Arts, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 754, 755 (criticizing the city for not producing
"any evidence regarding demand for [SOBs] within the city"). This often requires courts
to determine the existing number of SOBs (supply) as well as whether the number accu-
rately reflects the demographics and population (demand). See also Isbell v. City of San
Diego, 258 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2001).
141. Centerfold Club, Inc. v. City of St. Petersburg, 969 F. Supp. 1288, 1307 (M.D. Fla.
1997).
142. Executive Arts, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 754.
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actually exist. Often the city must present not only a zoning map
demonstrating that alternative sites exist, but also provide expert evi-
dence that specifically demonstrates that the sites are viable alterna-
tives.43 This inquiry requires some guesswork because under the
"supply and demand" test courts sometimes focus not only on how
the ordinance impacts the specific SOB involved in the suit, but also
on "hypothetical adult businesses that may or may not seek to locate
within the City" after enacting the ordinance.'"
The "supply and demand" approach to providing reasonable al-
ternative sites has one major flaw. It does not recognize that zoning
almost inevitably has some negative economic impact.' 5 When busi-
nesses are forced to relocate, some may be forced out of business be-
cause of the relocation costs. Often a suboptimal location will also
impact sales, as customers are deterred by the inconvenience of driv-
ing a farther distance to get to the SOB or because it is relocated in
an unsafe neighborhood. Justice Kennedy's comments in Alameda
that the "quantity" of speech should be left intact, as well as many
lower courts applying the supply and demand approach, do not rec-
ognize the realities of zoning. They assume that if the city ensures an
equal (or greater) number of SOB sites, that the quantity of speech
will be left intact. There are three problems with this assumption.
First, this imposes an obligation on the government to ensure
that there are viable places for the SOB to relocate. In a tight real es-
tate market, this may be impossible. The government has no control
over whether owners will sell or rent space to SOBs in the areas
where SOBs are zoned. In addition, the government has no control
over the competition that may arise in the adult business market of a
city. Maybe adult business patrons will convert to accessing internet
pornography sites rather than continuing to attend an SOB that is
zoned outside the city center. However, under Justice Kennedy's ap-
143. Id. at 750. See also N.W. Enters. Inc. v. City of Houston, 352 F.3d 162, 182-83 (5th
Cir. 2003) (requiring specific methodology or map to "verify conclusion" of city expert
who provided an affidavit that there were 183 alternative sites with 128 existing SOBs in
Houston).
144. Executive Arts, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 753. See also Diamond v. City of Taft, 215 F.3d
1052, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 2000) (where only one party is seeking to open a business, seven
sites were sufficient); Hickerson v. City of New York, 146 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 1998) (city
met its burden by showing land could accommodate 500 establishments, which was three
times the number of current establishments); Red-Eyed Jack, Inc. v. City of Daytona
Beach, 322 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1375 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (A total of twenty-five sites available
to adult businesses is constitutionally adequate when "only ten businesses are operating or
seeking to operate in Daytona Beach[.]").
145. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (recognizing that a "zoning
ordinance usually has an impact on the value of the property which it regulates").
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proach, a local government cannot assume that any fewer patrons will
attend the SOB in the new location.1" Suppose that an SOB demon-
strates to a city council that zoning it to another location will cut
down its customer base. If the city still zones the SOB, does that mean
that the city assumed that fewer patrons would frequent the SOB,
therefore acting impermissibly? This line of reasoning imposes an ob-
ligation on the government to ensure a viable space
4 7 for an SOB
when all government can do is to provide a theoretical space' in the
zoning scheme.
Further, in rezoning other commercial businesses, the govern-
ment never has to guarantee that an existing or future business will be
viable in a new location.' 9 The government has no obligation to con-
sider this, unless the zoning regulation has actually deprived the land
of all economic value.' Even in areas where the government regu-
lates commercial speech, the government must only ensure that it
does not suppress speech, not that it maintains the speech in the same
quantity. For example, with a constitutional ordinance that banned all
signs on city poles, the Supreme Court determined that there were
adequate alternative avenues for speech available to city residents.
5
'
146. See supra note 59 for further discussion.
147. Some courts have recognized that all that is constitutionally required is a theoreti-
cal space, not a viable one. MJ Entm't Enters., Inc. v. City of Mount Vernon, 328 F. Supp.
2d 480, 484-85 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (recognizing that even though the four sites currently
available for the operation of an adult entertainment business are "already in use" and
"would have to be acquired or leased, and even subdivided" they were available for con-
stitutional purposes; but only considering "total commercial land area, rather than total
land area," as reasonable alternative avenues). See also Hickerson, 146 F.3d at 106 (noting
that even land that is already occupied, or undeveloped land that is not for sale or lease, is
not to be automatically deemed unavailable); Grand Brittain, Inc. v. City of Amarillo, 27
F.3d 1068, 1069-70 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that zoning ordinance provided reasonable
alternative avenues of communication even though 90% of prospective sites were on un-
developed land).
148. A theoretically viable space would be one that would not be impossible for the
SOB to relocate to. For example, if a city zoned SOBs only to one area where there is al-
ready an airport, this would not be a theoretically viable space.
149. Besides, it seems illogical that SOBs would fight rezoning plans if they believed
that they will have the same number of customers before and after the ordinance. Justice
Kennedy infers that this would be proper in Alameda. See supra note 59. He states that the
city's premise must not be that speech will be reduced in order to reduce secondary effects
but he does not state that if the number of SOBs is reduced for factors out of the city's
hands (like market availability, cost or willingness to sell/rent to SOBs) that the ordinance
would not be valid. Id.
150. This would be considered a taking under the Takings Clause of the Constitution.
U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation").
151. See Members of City Council of City of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
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However, the city did not have to find private store windows or poles
that would allow the posters formerly posted on government utility
poles to relocate to so that all of the previous posters would have a
new place to be posted. This requirement seems burdensome in other
zoning contexts, but this is exactly what the government is required to
do in many cities when zoning SOBs.
Second, this assumption places the government in the role of a
real estate manager rather than a regulator. Under the supply and
demand approach, the government is given the obligation to ensure
that the demand of the city for SOBs is met by the SOB supply.
Matching up supply and demand has traditionally been a role of the
market, not the government. Courts that require the local govern-
ment to present comparisons of the number of available sites and the
size of the population require an especially large government role in
the management of the market. In order to get an accurate ratio of
the supply and demand for SOBs, the government would have to con-
sider not only zoning but evidence of frequency and number of visi-
tors to SOBs, unless it assumed that the demand for SOBs was the
same in every community. Also, requiring a minimum number of
SOBs to exist in every community does not take into account the fact
that different communities have different values and that the demand
for SOBs is higher in some communities than others. This calculus
would also have to consider that the demand for SOBs may be dy-
namic as technology and the make-up of city populations constantly
change.
Third, it assumes that zoning does not have a negative impact on
the quantity of speech. Courts have recognized that time, place, and
manner restrictions may have some effect on the quantity of speech.152
Courts have also recognized specifically that zoning regulations oftenhave a negative economic impact. Even Supreme Court-approved
zoning schemes (like dispersal of SOBs throughout a city) can pre-
vent new SOBs from opening.153 Concentrating SOBs, another consti-
789, 815 (1984) (noting the existence of alternative channels of communication).
152. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 77-78 (1976) (Powell, J., concur-
ring) (noting that zoning ordinances may cause economic loss but this is no different than
other economic enterprises that are confronted by land use regulations). JusticeO'Connor also noted in Alameda that the Los Angeles ordinance was a proper "time,place and manner regulation" despite the fact that its may force the closing of all adult
video arcades in the city. See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425,
443 (2002).
153. Sam R. Collins, Adults Only! Can We Zone Away the Evils of Adult Businesses?,
13 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 177, 189 (1997) (citing JEROME A. SIEGAN
& MAUREEN KELLY IVORY, THE REGULATION OF ADULT USES IN THE CITY OF
[Vnl ql.4
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tutional zoning approach, has also been shown to reduce the number
of SOBs in a city.154 Without recognizing that zoning regulations inevi-
tably have a negative economic impact, the Court imposes an impos-
sible burden on local governments to maintain the quantity of speech.
As demonstrated, the supply and demand test places a large, if
not impossible, burden on local governments. However, Justice Ken-
nedy's statement and lower court opinions, which require a zoning
regulation not to have an appreciable effect on the quantity of speech,
make perfect sense under the current secondary effects test. The sec-
ondary effects test allows cities to regulate SOBs based on the prem-
ise that they are only targeting the negative effects of the speech, not
the speech itself. Under this premise, it is logical that since the ordi-
nance can only target the negative effects, then the city should leave
the quantity of speech intact. And since the quantity of speech must
be intact, then there must be approximately the same number of SOB
sites after as existed before the ordinance. However, as illustrated
above, zoning sometimes impacts the quantity of speech. Thus, the
secondary effects approach that requires the same quantity of speech
before and after an ordinance may set an economically unattainable
result for many cities. Adding the problem of government interven-
tion in the SOB market, this leads to a logistically and economically
untenable regime where a local government has to ensure the eco-
nomic viability of SOBs when enacting zoning ordinances-
contravening the broad deference courts should allow states in zon-
ing.
IV. A Viewpoint Neutral Exception to Content Based Zoning
This section articulates an alternative approach to zoning of
adult businesses that replaces the secondary effects test. This test ad-
vocates a break from Supreme Court precedent in Renton and Ala-
meda, but is consistent with the plurality's rationale in Young. This
"viewpoint neutral" approach avoids the weaknesses of the secondary
effects test that erode the state zoning power.
A. The Viewpoint Neutral Approach does not Completely Depart from
Supreme Court Precedent
In conceptualizing adult business zoning, the Supreme Court in
Young set forth two rationales under which cities could regulate adult
businesses without violating the First Amendment. One rationale, of
CHICAGO 25 (1983)).
154. Id. at 187.
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course, was the secondary effects test that arose from Justice Powell's
concurrence and was adopted by the Court in Renton. However, the
other justification for cities to regulate adult businesses was because it
is an exception like defamation and commercial speech.' The Young
Court explained that adult business zoning was a proper content
based regulation of speech, like commercial speech, defamation, and
obscenity, and therefore was not subject to strict scrutiny. Then, the
Court recognized two important similarities between these areas. The
Court recognized that regulations in all four categories were view-
point neutral and low-value speech.
The Young plurality recognized that viewpoint neutral, but con-
tent based, regulation was proper. The Court compared adult zoning
to defamation, commercial speech, and obscene speech. In analogiz-
ing to commercial speech,'56 the Court pointed out that regulations of
advertisements may be content based.'57 For example, "[a] public
rapid transit system may accept some advertisements and reject oth-
ers," or "[a] state statute may permit highway billboards to advertise
businesses located in the neighborhood but not elsewhere."'' How-
ever, these content based regulations must not violate "the govern-
ment's paramount obligation of neutrality in its regulation of pro-
tected communication."'5 9 Applying this standard to the zoning
regulation at hand, the Court pointed out that "the regulation of the
places where sexually explicit films may be exhibited [must be] ...
unaffected by whatever social, political, or philosophical message a
film may be intended to communicate. 6° The Court further noted that
the "essence" of the content based standard is the need for the gov-
ernment in "its regulation of communication... [to] not be affected
by sympathy or hostility for the point of view being expressed by the
communicator.' 16' The Court basically explained that a regulation can
155. The Court also analogized to obscene speech. Young, 427 U.S. at 66.
156. With reference to defamation, the Court pointed out that it is proper to apply dif-
ferent standards depending on the content of allegedly defamatory newspaper articles.Young, 427 U.S. at 66 (demonstrating that the "differences in content may require a dif-
ferent government response"). If the article is about a public official, the standard of proof
for defamation is higher than for an ordinary person. Id. at 67.
157. Id. at 68.
158. Id. (citing Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748(1976) and Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974)).
159. Id. at 70.
160. Id. (The Court further pointed out that "whether a motion picture ridicules or
characterizes one point of view or another, the effect of the ordinances is exactly the
same.).
161. Id. at 67 (emphasis added).
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be content based, as long as it is viewpoint neutral.'62
After recognizing the importance of viewpoint neutrality, the
Court further took into account that adult business speech is low-
value speech under the First Amendment. It recognized adult speech
may have some artistic value but society's interest in protecting this
expression is less than in protecting "untrammeled political de-
bate[.]"'63 This principle has resonated throughout Supreme Court
opinions regulating zoning and other regulations on adult busi-
164
nesses.
The Young plurality recognized several important points even
though it did not gain a majority: 1) zoning of adult businesses is con-
tent based regulation; however, it falls into an exception, like com-
mercial speech, so the government may regulate it, 2) a zoning regula-
tion must be viewpoint neutral in that it does not prefer one
viewpoint over another based on social or political preference, 3)
adult speech is low-value speech, and finally, 4) local governments
maintain broad zoning power. These are all important parts of the
viewpoint neutral zoning approach advocated in this Article.
The viewpoint neutral approach does not stray too far from
precedent because it applies the two-prong Renton test with interme-
diate scrutiny. This approach adopts the reasoning of the Stevens plu-
rality in Young that adult business zoning is a permissible exception
to content-based regulation, like commercial speech. It also verbalizes
the implicit recognition by the Stevens plurality that viewpoint neu-
trality is the crucial requirement for zoning regulations. Further, it
acknowledges, as Justice Kennedy did in Alameda, that calling adult
business regulations "content neutral," is a fiction.'65 This approach
162. For a distinction between viewpoint based/neutral and content based/neutral see
Part I.
163. Young, 427 U.S. at 70 (The Young Court emphasized that although the "First
Amendment will not tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials that have some ar-
guably artistic value ... society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly
different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate[.]").
164. Id. (Justice Stevens in Young then pointed out in a famous quote that demon-
strates the less-valuable nature of adult business expression that "few of us would march
our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see 'Specified Sexual
Activities' exhibited in the theaters of our choice.").
165. Justice Kennedy disagreed with the Alameda Court's characterization of this or-
dinance as "content neutral" and described it as a "fiction." City of Los Angeles v. Ala-
meda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 444-45, 448 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining
that an ordinance which "describes speech by content... is content based"). Justice Ken-
nedy and three dissenters agree that adult business zoning is content based, not content
neutral. See also Peek-A-Boo Lounge of Brandenton, Inc. v. Manatee County, 337 F.3d
1251, 1266 n.14 (11th Cir. 2003) (implicitly rejecting the content-neutral label attached to
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agrees with Justice Scalia that the secondary effects test is unneces-
sary and that some communities can suppress adult businesses en-
tirely.' 6' However, it disagrees with Scalia's premise, brought out in
earlier cases, that SOBs do not produce protectable "expression" un-
der the First Amendment. It recognizes adult entertainment as low-
value expression, which is less protectable under the First Amend-
ment.
B. The Viewpoint Neutral Approach Avoids Erosion of the State Zoning
Power
The viewpoint neutral approach allows courts to apply the two-
prong Renton test without eroding the state's zoning power. It allows
for broader deference as to what constitutes an "important govern-
ment interest," under the first prong of Renton. With the secondary
effects test, an important government interest must be that adult
businesses cause negative secondary effects. This often forces cities to
provide some evidence of secondary effects. The city may also have to
demonstrate that negative secondary effects are caused by adult busi-
nesses or that the city's approach will be effective in reducing secon-
dary effects. The specifics of the evidence required varies depending
on the court, some requiring evidence specific to the type of SOB,
size of city, or type of ordinance proposed.
In contrast, an important government interest under the view-
point neutral approach does not require proof of any of the above. It
recognizes that adult business zoning is a permissible content based
regulation, but does not require evidence of secondary effects. The
city must only demonstrate that the ordinance is viewpoint neutral
and regulates low-value speech. The government must demonstrate
first that the ordinance is viewpoint neutral and does not discriminate
between adult businesses depending on whatever "social, political, or
philosophical message" is expressed. 167 Once that is demonstrated,
since adult speech is considered low-value speech,168 the court must
allow broad deference to the government to articulate an important
government interest. The government's interest does not have to be a
quantifiable interest, as often required under the secondary effects
test. The government may regulate for the same reasons it regulates
adult business zoning ordinances and instead calling it "intermediate scrutiny").
166. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 443-44 (Scalia, J., concurring).
167. Young, 427 U.S. at 70.
168. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973) (noting that "crass com-
mercial exploitation of sex" has been determined to be a serious problem that warrants
state and federal regulation).
rvnl " 1.4
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other concerns under its police power, namely to uphold public mo-
rality,169 preserve urban neighborhoods,17 and prevent decay of family
relationships.17 In addition, cities could present more tangible con-
cerns such as crime, drug use, prostitution, and sexual assault but
would not be required to provide evidence that these problems al-
ready exist in their city or that the ordinance would be effective in re-
ducing these problems. As long as the government interest did not
aim to eliminate adult speech entirely, it would be valid.172 At the
same time, cities seeking the opposite image would be free to zone
adult businesses more prominently in the city. Cities that want to
draw adults seeking a vibrant nightlife, who want to appear more ris-
qu6 and exciting, or simply want to capitalize on the market for adult
entertainment are free to facilitate this through zoning. Under this
approach, cities retain broad zoning power and can experiment with
different solutions to adult business zoning, depending on their goals
and visions for the city.
Although this approach would dramatically reduce the burden
on cities to prove an important government interest under Renton's
first prong, the second prong of the Renton test would still ensure that
speech received adequate protection. The second prong assures that
the ordinance allows for reasonable alternative avenues of communi-
cation.
169. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954)
170. Young, 427 U.S. at 71.
171. The Ninth Circuit recently rejected SOBs argument that some secondary effects
evidence was not "scientific" or tangible evidence in World Wide Video of Washington,
Inc. v. City of Spokane, 368 F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004). The court considered as
relevant testimony by "a pedodontist working in a building less than a block away from a
retail-only store [who] complained of pornographic litter, harassment of female
employees, vandalism, and decreased business, all resulting from his proximity" to the
adult business. Id. The court further approved of the city's goal in decreasing both
"economic and aesthetic impacts upon neighboring properties and the community as a
whole" with the adult zoning ordinance. Id.
172. As long as the government did not zone SOBs with the purpose of eliminating
their expression entirely, this would be acceptable. See Part V.D.
Sometimes it is enough for a city ordinance to state in a preamble that the purpose of
the ordinance is not to suppress speech but to target something else (such as deterioration
of urban life, crime, etc.). As long as the statute is more like a "typical land use" regulation
than a law suppressing speech, it is likely to pass the test. See City of Los Angeles v. Ala-
meda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 447 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Typical land use
regulations allow cities to zone out unwanted stores if there is a rational basis for this. See,
e.g., Manalapan Realty v. Township Comm. of the Township of Manalapan, 658 A.2d
1230, 1237 (N.J. 1995). However, when speech is concerned the city must undergo inter-
mediate scrutiny and demonstrate an important government interest (rather than simply a
rational basis).
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While adult zoning ordinances are considered time, place, and
manner regulations,'173 because of the secondary effects test, they have
not been analyzed like other time, place, and manner regulations.' In
adult business zoning cases courts have imposed a greater burden to
prove that alternative avenues of communication exist. This is be-
cause the premise under the secondary effects test is that cities regu-
late the negative effects of speech but do not harm the speech itself.
Since this test requires that zoning regulations only harm speech inci-
dentally, lower courts have imposed strict requirements on cities to
ensure that the "quantity of speech" remains intact. As discussed
above, many cities have set quotas for the number of SOBs that
should exist in certain sized cities in order for a zoning ordinance to
be valid. These quotas require the government to regulate the supply
and demand for SOBs and do not recognize that sometimes, zoning
regulations hurt SOBs economically and sometimes even cause SOBs
to go out of business.
Under the viewpoint neutral approach, however, cities can regu-
late SOBs while recognizing that zoning regulations may have a nega-
173. The standard requirements for a proper time, place, and manner regulation are
that it is 1) content neutral; 2) narrowly drawn to promote an important government inter-
est; and 3) it leaves alternative channels of communication open. Ward v. Rock Against Ra-
cism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) Although the time, place, or manner test originated with publicproperty, Renton expanded its application to private property. See City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
It is important to note though that adult business zoning is a unique type of time,place, or manner regulation because it is content based not content neutral. In Renton, the
Court determined that due to the secondary effects test, adult zoning regulations were
content neutral. This allowed the Court to analyze adult zoning ordinances under the time,
place, and manner test. However, in Alameda, Justice Kennedy (whose opinion formed
the law in this case) claimed that adult business zoning was content based. The majority of
the Court (including Kennedy) still held that the ordinance was a proper regulation under
the Renton secondary effects test. It seems as if Justice Kennedy's opinion implicitly over-
rules the requirement that time, place, and manner regulations must be content neutral.However, while Kennedy would probably justify adult business zoning as a content-based
exception (to the time, place, and manner test) based on secondary effects, this Article
argues that it is a proper exception because it regulates low-value speech and is viewpoint
neutral. In other words, because adult zoning ordinances regulate low-value speech and
are viewpoint neutral, they are not required to meet the first prong of the time, place, and
manner test. Instead, the regulation must be 1) a viewpoint neutral regulation of 2) low-
value speech, and 3) must promote an important government interest, and 4) leave alter-
native channels of communication open.
The only other remaining difference between the tests is that the time, place, and
manner test specifically mentions that an ordinance "must be narrowly tailored" to the
government interest and the Renton test never required narrow tailoring. Therefore, the
viewpoint neutral approach proposed here also does not require narrow tailoring.
174. For a comparison of how other time, place, and manner regulations are analyzed,
see Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
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tive economic impact. Although this may cause a decrease in the
"quantity" of this kind of adult speech, this is in line with other time,
place, and manner regulations that recognize that the government is
not responsible for ensuring that the most favorable (or as many)
channels of communication are available. In other time, place, and
manner cases, government regulations can reduce the number of
channels for speech or foreclose a channel of speech altogether.'75
This has been applied even to high-value political and social speech as
well as low-value commercial speech.176 For example, in Clark v.
Community for Creative Nonviolence, the Court upheld a city ordi-
nance that banned sleeping in certain parks, even though it prohibited
a demonstration where activists planned to sleep in a public park to
bring attention to the plight of the homeless. 7 The Court recognized
that there were alternative avenues for communicating this speech,
even though they may not be as effective, and upheld this ordinance
as a proper time, place, or manner regulation. Similarly, in commer-
cial speech cases, local governments have been permitted to exclude
billboards and certain stores altogether, while still allowing reason-
able alternative avenues of communication. Without the secondary
effects test, cities can provide a theoretically viable alternative loca-
tion in the zoning plan without assuring that the quantity of speech
remains intact. If market conditions or even public pressure on sellers
prevent SOBs from relocating after a zoning ordinance, the local gov-
ernment would not be responsible for assuring a viable location. Al-
though, cities would not be permitted to eliminate SOBs altogether.7
175. A time, place, and manner statute is valid if it strikes directly at the source of the
problem, a problem "created by the medium of expression itself" even if it reduces the
best avenue for speech. Taxpayers for Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent,
466 U.S. 789, 810-11 (1984).
176. The Supreme Court explained that commercial speech was not "wholly outside"
First Amendment protection, but also that it was not at the "core" First Amendment
speech. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
761 (1976) (pointing out that several types of commercial speech such as religious litera-
ture, movies, and advertisements do not lack any First Amendment protection);
JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 3, § 10.16 (describing the early Supreme Court
protection of commercial speech as "tepid").
177. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Nonviolence, 468 U.S. 288, 296 (1984) ("[T]he regula-
tion [that prohibits overnight camping] narrowly focuses on the government's substantial
interest in maintaining the parks in the heart of our capitol in an attractive and intact con-
dition .... To permit camping-using these areas as living accommodation-would be to-
tally inimical to these purposes."). It is important to note, however, that this ordinance
prohibited all people from sleeping in public parks, so it was content neutral unlike many
SOB zoning ordinances. Id. at 293-94.
178. Some members of the Supreme Court throughout the years have commented that
residential communities should be able to zone out SOBs altogether. In Schad v. Borough
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This section has provided a broad explanation of how "viewpoint
neutral" zoning is consistent with Supreme Court precedent and how
it may resolve some of the weaknesses of the secondary effects test.
The next section carefully defines the various aspects of this test and
demonstrates how courts may apply this test.
V. Application of the Viewpoint Neutral Zoning Test
This section defines various important terms in the viewpoint
neutral zoning test and provides examples of how it should be applied
by courts. First, it defends the use of the low-value/high-value distinc-
tion for adult entertainment expression. Second, it explains what it
means for an adult business zoning ordinance to be "viewpoint neu-
tral." Third, it provides examples of proper government interests in
zoning adult businesses. Fourth, it explains how cities can leave rea-
sonable alternative avenues of communication. Finally, this section
indicates that the viewpoint neutral exception may not apply broadly
to other content based speech regulations.
A. Low-value Speech
Nude dancing and other adult entertainment are considered low-
value speech. Low-value speech is speech that does not comment on
public affairs and is not of "social and political significance."' 79 Adult
expression should not be treated differently than other speech, not
because of its negative effects, but because it contributes little of pub-
lic importance.' Some commentators criticize that drawing a distinc-
of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 76 (1981), Justice White, joined by two justices, held that
a city must "leave open adequate alternative channels of communication" and cannot to-
tally exclude nude dancing. Justice Blackman agreed in his concurrence. However, Justice
Powell and Stewart disagreed and held that residential communities could limit commer-
cial establishments (including "commercial public entertainment") if they so desired. Id. at
79. Justice Rehnquist and Burger agreed on this point. Justice Stevens' concurrence as-
serted that if the setting of the town was "tranquil" rather than a commercial setting, then
he would agree that the Borough may prohibit nude dancing even though it "is a form of
expressive activity protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 83 (Stevens, J., concurring).
However, he was not sure in this case because the record was unclear. In total, five justices
agreed that a residential community did not have to provide alternative channels of com-
munication when prohibiting nude dancing.
Justice Scalia believes that all cities should be able to ban businesses "pandering sex."
City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 443-44 (2002) (Scalia, J., con-
curring).
179. Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589,
603-06 (arguing that pornography is low-value speech because it has "little to do with pub-
lic affairs").
180. The Court has implicitly recognized that adult entertainment expression is low-
value speech in placing it on "the borderline between pornography and artistic expres-
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tion between low and high-value speech is incompatible with the First
Amendment.81 However, the Court does not seem to agree. The Su-
preme Court has recognized several types of low-value speech that
receive little or no protection under the First Amendment. These in-
clude obscenity," defamatory speech child pornography,'" fighting
words,85 and commercial advertising."8 Other commentators criticize
this distinction because of the difficulty in drawing lines between low
and high-value speech.87 Although it may be difficult in some cases
for courts to determine what is low and high-value speech, this is not
much different than other types of line drawing that the Court has
undertaken. For example, the Court has distinguished between artis-
tic nude photography, which is protected under the First Amend-
ment, and obscene pornography, which is unprotected.'8 Courts have
also distinguished between noncommercial political billboards, which
are protected, and commercial billboards, which are less protected. 9
In addition, courts have distinguished nude modern dance perform-
ances and nude dancing at SOBs.'9 In most cases, the line drawing
problem is not as difficult as it may seem.
sion." Young v. Am. Mini Theatres Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 61 (1976). The Court has also recog-
nized that adult entertainment expression falls "within the outer border of the First
Amendment's protection." Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1991).
181. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767,
823-24 (2001) (criticizing the low-value speech distinction as contrary to the First
Amendment).
182. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
183. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
184. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 762 (1982) (stating that "the value of permit-
ting live performances and photographic reproductions of children engaged in lewd exhi-
bitions is exceedingly modest, if not de minimis").
185. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
186. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
187. See, e.g., Arnold H. Loewy, The Use, Nonuse, and Misuse of Low-value Speech, 58
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 195,202 (2001).
188. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,231 (1977).
189. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (the Court plurality
agreeing that an ordinance completely banning commercial billboards but allowing non-
commercial (political) billboards would be constitutional).
190. Ranch House, Inc. v. Amerson, 238 F.3d 1273, 1276, 1281 (11th Cir. 2001) (distin-
guishing between nude adult entertainment establishments that are businesses and nude
performances for non-profit artistic purposes); Triplett Grille, Inc. v. City of Akron, 816 F.
Supp. 1249, 1257 n.6 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (pointing out that there is a difference between
adult entertainment and "other nude dancing which includes the kind of artistic quality or
social or political message anticipated by the third part of the Miller obscenity test").
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B. Viewpoint Neutral
For a zoning ordinance to be viewpoint neutral it cannot express
agreement or disagreement with the message conveyed by the com-
municator. Courts are often confused between content neutrality and
viewpoint neutrality. Content based laws include laws that prohibit
pamphleteering by religious groups, "forbid the hiring of teachers
who advocate the violent overthrow of government, or outlaw the
display of the swastika in certain neighborhoods."' 9' In contrast, view-
point based laws would allow pro-abortion picketers while excluding
pro-life picketers from a public park, impose fees on Democratic
campaign billboards but not Republican Party billboards or outlaw
the display of anti-war yard signs but not pro-war yard signs.
An opponent may argue that adult speech is not even intended
to express a viewpoint but to illicit a physical response. Thus, there is
no such thing as viewpoint based or viewpoint neutral zoning of adult
entertainment. There are two responses to this argument. First, if
adult entertainment did not express a viewpoint, whether it be social,
political or moral, it would not be as highly protected under the First
Amendment. If adult entertainment's sole purpose is to elicit a physi-
cal response for money, it may be considered commercial speech,
which is less protected under the First Amendment than adult enter-
tainment expression. 1"
Second, the Supreme Court has always assumed that adult enter-
tainment expresses some viewpoint. The Young plurality explained
viewpoint neutrality in stating that zoning ordinances cannot express
"sympathy or hostility for the point of view of the communicator."'1 93
Implicit in this statement is that adult entertainment speech expresses
different viewpoints. In fact, a few commentators have suggested that
cities should adopt ordinances that censor pornography that objecti-
fies women but allow pornography that illustrates women as active
participants.' 94 This would be a viewpoint based law. Just as there are
191. Stone, supra note 29, at 190. Content neutral laws include "[1laws that prohibit noisy
speeches near a hospital, ban billboards in residential communities, impose license fees for pa-
rades and demonstrations, or forbid the distribution of leaflets in public places." Id. at 189-90.
192. The Court protects adult expression more than commercial speech. However, the
distinction recognized between a strip club and an artistic nude performance is probably
that the strip club is a business whereas the nude performance is art. Although courts have
not clarified this distinction, maybe the similarity is that both types of dancing express an
erotic message, which is protectable.
193. Young, 427 U.S. at 67.
194. Amy Adler, What's Left: Hate Speech, Pornography, and the Problem for Artistic
Expression, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1499, 1530-31 (1996); Stacy J. Cooper, Sexual Harassment
and the Swedish Bikini Team: A Reevaluation of the "Hostile Environment" Doctrine, 26
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different viewpoints expressed in pornography, there are different
viewpoints expressed in adult films, nude dancing, and other adult en-
tertainment. For example, a viewpoint based zoning ordinance may
zone SOBs only if they express the view that women are sex objects
for men to gratify themselves (but not if they express the view that
women like sex). This ordinance expresses sympathy to SOBs with
the view that women enjoy sex but hostility to SOBs that view women
as reticent participants in sex. It would therefore be an impermissible
viewpoint based law. However, if a city ordinance zones all SOBs to
the outskirts of town because they are tacky, it would not be a view-
point based ordinance. It would be content based, but it would not be
viewpoint based because it does not distinguish between the SOBs
based on the point of view expressed. Instead, it would zone all SOBs
to a particular part of town. Therefore, it would be more like the zon-
ing ordinances that banned all commercial billboards (content based)
than an ordinance that outlaws display of anti-war yard signs but not
pro-war yard signs (viewpoint based). This same rationale would ap-
ply to a city council that wanted to zone all adult businesses to a
prominent location in a city because it wanted to promote the city's
market for SOBs. As long as the city did not distinguish between the
different adult businesses based on the message expressed, this would
be constitutional.
C. Important Government Interest
The viewpoint neutral approach allows a broad array of impor-
tant government interests to satisfy the first prong of the Renton test.
Under this approach, cities are not restricted to a greater extent in
zoning SOBs than they are in zoning other commercial businesses.9
Cities may zone SOBs because they violate community values, for
aesthetics (because of neon lights and gaudy signs), or to uphold the
character of a neighborhood (whether it be a morally conservative or
liberal character). Some communities may also want to zone SOBs
because they degrade and silence women,' 96 disrupt marriages or de-
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 387, 430-31 (1993).
195. See supra note 173 for further discussion..
196. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED DISCOURSE ON LIFE AND LAW 155 (1987) (noting that pornog-
raphy is a means of binding women); ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN
POSSESSING WOMEN (4th ed. 1989) (explaining that pornography is misogynous); Catha-
rine A. MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 321, 323-24 (1984) (de-
scribing pornography as discrimination which defines the treatment of women and silences
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stroy healthy sexual relationships. Allowing cities to zone SOBs for a
broader array of purposes is a more honest approach than the secon-
dary effects test. It recognizes the reality that cities are not only inter-
ested in the crime and effects on property values brought by SOBs,
but the effects of SOBs on relationships and community values. Cities
have had to hide some of the reasons for zoning ordinances behind
statistical evidence of secondary effects caused by SOBs. Supreme
Court precedent does not have to dictate such a result. Since adult
speech is of low-value, cities should have broad deference in articulat-
ing an important government interest. Cities should be able to zone
SOBs because they violate (or uphold) community values or because
they degrade (or liberate) women in addition to any secondary effects
they may cause.
One may argue that it is underinclusive to zone SOBs based on
public morality. The argument would be that a city would have to ban
SOBs to demonstrate an important government interest in public mo-
rality. If the city is interested in preserving community morals, then
zoning SOBs to particular areas in the town does not satisfy this gov-
ernment interest. However, the city can allow some SOBs to exist
away from the most frequently visited areas of town and still have an
important interest in upholding public morality. A city may preserve
the general character and values of the community even by keeping
SOBs away from city centers and sensitive areas like churches,
schools, and residential communities. If zoned in this manner, they
may be avoided by the members of the community who do not want
to be exposed to them. This would recognize the difference between
zoning regulations and other types of government regulations on
speech. In zoning, the city is presumed to be planning and creating a
community of a certain character. While some communities may al-
low U-shaped concrete homes without any windows,'" others can
permissibly ban these types of homes. Some communities allow neon-
laden strip malls and Wal-mart superstores, and others reject these '98
and "enslaves women's minds and bodies").
197. Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 119 Ohio App. 67, 70-71 (1963) (allowing a
denial of a permit for a home that was a "flat-roofed complex of twenty modules, each of
which is ten feet high, twelve feet square and arranged in a loosely formed 'U' which
winds its way through a grove of trees").
198. See, e.g., Coronadans Organized For Retail Enhancement v. City of Coronado,
2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5769, at *3 (4th Dist. June 13, 2003) (upholding a regula-
tion that did not allow "formula retail establishments" preserved "the community's char-
acter and ambiance"). Wal-Mart stores have been rejected by communities nationwide
for many reasons, including that they detract from the character of the community. A re-
cent blow to the corporation is that New York City rejected a Wal-Mart store. Steven
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and zone a city with a traditional urban feel with small shops and
walkable commercial districts. These are the kinds of liberties pro-
vided to states under the zoning power. Just like cities can plan a
community that rejects a Wal-mart superstore for aesthetic reasons or
because it favors the look and feel of small shopping centers, a city
should also be able to locate SOBs in the areas that best reflect a
city's values. For a city like Las Vegas, this may mean that SOBs are
reserved a prominent position in the center of town, but for some
other cities, SOBs may best be located in the outskirts of the commu-
nity.
D. Reasonable Alternative Avenues
While a city may zone for the broad array of reasons discussed
above, it must still leave reasonable alternative avenues of speech,
under Renton's second prong. Therefore, regardless of what commu-
nity values dictate, a city cannot zone all existing SOBs out of the
community. Since adult speech is protected by the First Amendment,
a city must not "suppress" speech. A city does not suppress speech by
zoning SOBs unless it zones SOBs entirely out of a community or
provides only a "fictional" spot in the zoning plan to relocate a SOB.
For example, if a city zones SOBs to one spot where there is already a
city monument located, this would not allow a reasonable alternative
avenue of communication.1" However, an ordinance that zoned SOBs
to the industrial section of town, even though there are no spots for
sale there, would be appropriate.20 The key is that the city should not
have to guarantee adult businesses a new location when market con-
ditions may dictate otherwise. A city should not have to create a
quota of available sites for all of the SOBs that will be rezoned.
Therefore, a zoning scheme that causes the number of SOBs to de-
crease may still be constitutional. As long as the decrease in SOBs is
just like any other negative economic effect caused by a land use re-
striction, it would not constitute zoning with the "purpose of sup-
pressing adult speech."
Greenhouse, Developer Drops Plans for City's First Wal-Mart, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2005
at 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/24/nyregion/24walmart.html (last visited
March 1, 2005).
199. See also supra note 147.
200. D.G. Rest. Corp. v. City of Myrtle Beach, 953 F.2d 140, 147 (4th Cir. 1991) (not-
ing that while it may not be as "commercially desirable to operate" in an industrial area,
the zoning ordinance, "it has not been demonstrated that the restriction.., will impede
the restaurant's ability to convey its message to those listeners who desire to be enlight-
ened by it").
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E. Application of the Viewpoint Neutral Exception
The viewpoint neutral exception to the time, place, and manner
test may only apply to zoning cases. As discussed above, SOB zoning
cases are similar to defdmation and commercial speech cases because
they are all exceptions to the general rule that content based regula-
tions must undergo strict scrutiny. However, the viewpoint neutral
exception does not apply to other permissible content based regula-
tions mentioned in Young, including defamation, obscenity, and
commercial speech. It probably also does not apply to other content
based exceptions, like workplace harassment speech. There are sev-
eral distinct categories of low-value speech. One category is content
based and viewpoint based speech that can be banned completely.
This includes workplace harassment speech. Workplace speech obvi-
ously does not fit within the viewpoint neutral exception because it is
viewpoint based. In fact, it is often the viewpoint expressed that
makes the speech impermissible. For example, "some of the speech
that harassment law suppresses is suppressed precisely because of its
point of view; saying that women make bad policemen can give rise to
liability, but saying that men and women should be treated equally
cannot. ' '201 Another category is content based but viewpoint neutral
speech that can be banned altogether. In this category is defamatory
speech and obscenity. This speech is not protected in any public set-
ting. The last category is content based but viewpoint neutral speech
that cannot be banned but can be limited by a time, place, or manner
regulation. This category includes adult entertainment speech and
profanity. It is unclear which category commercial speech falls into.
Some commercial advertising cases indicate that this speech can be
suppressed completely, and others disagree. Thus, it may fall in either
of the latter two categories.
Low-value speech is much more diverse than it may appear. The
various categories above demonstrate that the viewpoint neutral zon-
ing exception does not apply broadly to other categories of speech.
The only other type of speech that may fall in the same category as
adult entertainment speech is profanity.
VI. Conclusion
The balance between providing deference to local governments
in zoning and protecting speech'is a difficult one. On its face, the sec-
201. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L.
REv. 1791, 1828 (1992) (arguing that many commentators have taken the constitutionality
of work place speech regulations for granted).
[Vol. 31:4
Summer 2004] VIEWPOINT NEUTRAL ZONING OF ADULT BUSINESSES 495
ondary effects test seems to accomplish this balance. In theory, it pro-
vides broad deference to cities and requires very little evidence to
support a local zoning ordinance. However, when applied by lower
courts, it does not provide the appropriate balance. As this Article
demonstrates, the secondary effects test often requires local govern-
ments to provide evidence that secondary effects exist and that a pro-
posed ordinance will be effective in reducing these effects. It also re-
quires cities to ensure the commercial viability of adult businesses and
to take on the role of a real estate manager (rather than a regulator).
Even though a big part of the problem with the secondary effects
test is the great evidentiary burden it imposes on cities, this Article
does not argue that lower courts should simply provide broader def-
erence to local governments. Instead, it posits that the evidentiary
burdens are just symptoms of a larger problem with the entire secon-
dary effects approach. In fact, it is actually logical that the secondary
effects test requires cities to prove a high evidentiary burden. The
premise of the secondary effects test is that cities can zone adult busi-
nesses in a content neutral manner because they are targeting the
negative effects of the business and not the speech itself. Therefore, it
makes sense that a city should prove that negative effects are caused
by adult businesses before zoning these businesses. It is also logical
for a city to have to demonstrate that its ordinance does not impact
(the quantity of) speech, but only the secondary effects. Despite rely-
ing on the secondary effects rationale, the Supreme Court has insisted
that broad deference is due to local governments. However, the sec-
ondary effects approach is not logically consistent with this goal.
The viewpoint neutral approach to adult business zoning, as set
forth in this Article, may provide a logically consistent balance be-
tween speech and deference to local governments. Conceptualizing
adult business zoning as content based, but viewpoint neutral regula-
tion of low-value speech allows cities to zone adult businesses di-
rectly. Therefore, cities do not have to prove that adult businesses
cause negative secondary effects or demonstrate that an ordinance
does not impact speech. In addition, this approach does not depart
completely from Supreme Court precedent. The Young plurality jus-
tified its content based regulation of an adult business based on this
rationale. Although the Supreme Court majority has not adopted this
viewpoint neutral approach, the Court has emphasized that the key
for adult business zoning is viewpoint neutrality.
Under the viewpoint neutral approach, an important government
interest under the Renton test may include preserving public morality
or reducing crime. The city does not have to rely on negative secon-
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dary effects caused by adult businesses. Similarly, under the Renton
second prong, the Court does not have to demonstrate that a zoning
ordinance does not reduce the number of adult businesses in a com-
munity. The city must only demonstrate that its zoning scheme leaves
theoretically (but not commercially) viable locations for SOBs to re-
locate to.
Adopting the viewpoint neutral approach allows cities broader
deference to experiment with zoning solutions and may also lead to
more consistency in this area of First Amendment jurisprudence. Al-
though the viewpoint neutral zoning exception will not apply broadly
to other areas like defamation, workplace harassment, or obscenity,
abandoning the secondary effects test in SOB zoning cases may lead
to an abandonment of the test in closely related areas where it may be
unnecessary 2° and has also created problems. 3
202. In City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., the Court majority, including Justice O'Connor,
Rehnquist, Kennedy, Breyer, and Souter (partially concurring) relied on the secondary
effects test to justify an indecency regulation requiring nude dancers to wear pasties and g-
strings. 529 U.S. 277, 290 (2000) (plurality opinion). Lower courts have also adopted the
secondary effects rationale to justify public indecency statutes. See, e.g., Fly Fish, Inc. v.City of Cocoa Beach, 337 F.3d 1301, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003) (explaining that "totally nude
dancing in adult entertainment establishments generates undesirable secondary effects...[and the city ] is entitled to combat these effects, so long as it does not ban, but merely
regulates the erotic message").
In Pap's A.M., the Court relied on the O'Brien test. 529 U.S. at 291. The Court noted
that in O'Brien the government aimed to "maintain[] the integrity of the Selective Service
System and not to suppressing the message of draft resistance." Id. Similarly, here, theCourt reasoned that the ordinance prohibiting public nudity is "aimed at combating crime
and other negative secondary effects" of adult entertainment businesses, not at suppress-ing erotic speech. Id. at 297. It was unnecessary for the Court to justify its reliance on the
secondary effects rationale with O'Brien. The Court could have easily analogized to
O'Brien based on the fact that in both cases the government maintained a legitimate inter-
est (including public morality or the integrity of local communities), outside of suppression
of speech.
This would have also avoided the evidentiary burden now imposed on indecency or-
dinances because the Court cannot take the government's word on its motive to combat
secondary effects.
203. Lower courts may finally be able to reconcile public indecency and zoning regula-
tion and determine the appropriate constitutional balance in regulating both areas. Gov-
ernment indecency regulations (indecency ordinances) require nude dancers to don pas-
ties and g-strings. Indecency ordinances have often been analyzed similarly to adultbusiness zoning cases. The first indecency cases applied the O'Brien test. O'Brien is the
test that the Court adapted then adopted in Renton. For a description of the O'Brien test,
see supra note 47. Both the O'Brien test and Renton test have been applied to both zoning
and indecency regulation cases. The Supreme Court has noted several times that the
O'Brien and Renton tests are similar. The Renton Court, in setting forth its test, cited
O'Brien. Most Supreme Court cases analyzing indecency ordinances under the FirstAmendment have applied O'Brien. Pap's A.M, 529 U.S. at 279; Barnes v. Glen Theatre,
Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991). The O'Brien test seems to be the preferred test among the
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lower courts for indecency regulations.
Lower courts have also used the secondary effects rationale with both indecency and
zoning regulations. However, there is a fundamental but unrecognized distinction between
the two lines of cases. While it is a fiction to justify zoning ordinances as content neutral
regulations, government regulations on public nudity can rightfully be justified as content
neutral regulations. These are content neutral regulations when they ban all public nudity,
regardless of whether it contains expression and regardless of the viewpoint it expresses.
Justice O'Connor in Pap's A.M. held that the ordinance is content neutral because the or-
dinance is a general ban on public nudity and "bans conduct, not speech." Pap's A.M., 529
U.S. at 289. In other words, the ban does not "target nudity that contains an erotic mes-
sage" but "bans all public nudity, regardless of whether that nudity is accompanied by ex-
pressive activity." Id. at 290.
However, the public indecency regulations that only prohibit total public nudity at
adult establishments are clearly content based. See, e.g., Fly Fish, Inc., 337 F.3d at 1306. By
expanding the secondary effects test, courts have upheld some content based public inde-
cency regulations. Id. at 1308; see also SOB, Inc., et al. v. County of Benton, 317 F.3d 856,
862 (8th Cir. 2003) (explaining that a public indecency ordinance "is content-neutral if its
purpose is to combat harmful secondary effects").
These indecency ordinances should be analyzed differently than adult business zon-
ing, which is always content based speech regulation. Adult business zoning is content
based because it only applies to adult businesses and not to all people and entities like the
indecency regulations. However, government indecency regulations can properly be regu-
lated as content neutral regulations under the O'Brien test. This would prevent courts
from relying on the secondary effects test to justify public indecency ordinances, which
impose great evidentiary burdens on cities (just like zoning ordinances).
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